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Risk is inherent in many social and economic decisions, such as the choice of 
pathway in secondary school, the choice of major at university, job decisions, health-
related behaviour, marriage, parenthood, migration and the allocation of financial 
assets. Investigating the determinants of attitudes towards risk is therefore essential to 
fully understand how people make such decisions. Recent research has shown that 
individual risk attitudes are not immutable personality traits, but are influenced by 
external factors with the potential to change them in more or less enduring ways, such 
as the characteristics of the environment, emotional states, life experiences such as 
poverty, job loss or violence, and social relationships.  
This thesis studies external factors that play a role in shaping risk attitudes. 
Specifically, it focuses on two important environmental factors: social relationships 
and the incentive structure that individuals face (e.g., competition or teamwork).  
It is composed of three chapters. Each chapter of the thesis presents the results 
of a different laboratory experiment, in which individual risk behaviour is always 
measured using the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task - BRET (Crosetto and Filippin, 
2013). This task asks participants to choose how many boxes to collect out of 100, 
knowing that 99 boxes contain £0.10 while one contains a bomb, but without 
knowing in which box the bomb is located. They can therefore choose their preferred 
lottery among 100 lotteries whose outcomes and probabilities are fully described only 
by one parameter, i.e., the number of collected boxes. Earnings increase linearly with 
the number of boxes collected, but they are all lost if the bomb lies in one of the 
collected boxes. In the first two chapters, risk behaviour is measured both before and 
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after the treatment manipulation, and feedback on the peers’ ex-ante risk behaviour is 
used as a channel to study peer influence on the subjects’ ex-post risk behaviour. 
The first two chapters provide new evidence that individual risk behaviour is 
influenced by the risk behaviour of the peer group and offer one explanation for why 
peer effects are not always present and vary in intensity. This is due to the fact that 
individuals are more influenced by those peers with whom they feel more bonded. 
Specifically, in the first chapter I study how group identity (that is, the portion of an 
individual’s self-concept derived from the sense of belonging to the social group) 
affects peer effects on risk behaviour. I induce different levels of group identity 
through different matching protocols (random or based on individual painting 
preferences) and the possibility of interacting with group members via an online chat 
in a group task. I find that subjects are affected by their peers when taking decisions 
and that a stronger group identity amplifies the influence of peers: painting 
preferences matching significantly reduces the heterogeneity of risk behaviour 
compared with random matching. On the other hand, introducing a group task has no 
significant effect on behaviour, possibly because this interaction does not always 
contribute to enhancing group identity.  
The second chapter digs deeper into this evidence by investigating the role of 
the incentive structure that characterizes the individuals’ environment. Since the first 
chapter shows that peer effects vary in intensity, I hypothesize that different types of 
incentive schemes may have different effects on peer relationships and, therefore, 
affect peer effects on risk behaviour. Using a real effort task, which consists of 
recognizing the value and the country of origin of a random sequence of Euro coins, I 
compare piece-rate compensation first with a cooperation-based and then with a 
competition-based incentive scheme. I find that competition significantly reduces 
attachment to peers and more than halves peer influence on risk behaviour compared 
with piece-rate compensation, despite the fact that the latter effect is not statistically 
significant. Such findings suggest that, when designing and evaluating an optimal 
compensation scheme, it may be important to also consider how peer effects on 
subsequent risk behaviour will in turn affect future decisions involving risk. For 
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example, in research and development, competition may improve the results of 
current projects, but risk attitudes will shape the types of future projects that are 
attempted.  
The third chapter restricts the attention to competition and enquires whether this 
type of incentive scheme has a direct effect on risk-taking behaviour, beyond any 
social comparison, and whether its impact on subsequent risk behaviour is 
heterogeneous according to gender. Risk behaviour is measured after the performance 
of a real effort task, consisting of recognizing the value and country of origin of Euro 
coins, incentivized either as a tournament with fixed rewards or as a random draw 
with the same monetary payoffs. The data show that competition does not 
significantly affect subsequent risk-taking behaviour when considering the full 
sample. However, there is a positive relationship between competition and risk 
aversion for males, who become significantly more risk-averse after losing a 
competition than after randomly earning the same low payoff. In contrast, males do 
not become more risk-seeking after winning the tournament, while the average risk-
taking behaviour of females is unaffected by tournament participation and outcomes. 
The reaction of males to negative outcomes might be driven by intrinsic motives, 
such as emotions or a shift in the locus of control from internal to external. 
Overall, the evidence presented here shows that risk attitudes are not immutable 
but may be shaped by external factors. Of particular importance is the role played by 
the risk behaviour of peers, which begins to emerge even when bonds are weak and 
becomes stronger as the social link intensifies. Any policy that aims to change risk 
attitudes (or that does so indirectly) will thus see its effects spread to the target 
subjects’ peers, and may amplify its success if the peer group is chosen wisely. 
Changing the characteristics of the subjects’ environment by introducing competition 
weakens their attachment to the competing peers and may attenuate peer effects on 
risk behaviour. In addition, competition per se has no impact on subsequent risk 













Over their life course, people make many social and economic decisions influenced 
by their risk attitudes, such as choice of career, university degree course, study and 
work effort, marriage, parenthood, migration, smoking, drug and alcohol use, 
criminal activity and the allocation of financial assets. Knowing what influences risk 
attitudes is therefore essential for a full understanding of how people make such 
decisions. Recent research has shown that individual risk attitudes are shaped at least 
partly by external factors, such as the characteristics of their environment like family 
structure or their classroom’s gender composition, emotional states, life experiences 
like poverty, job loss or violence, and social relationships.  
The thesis contributes to our understanding of what influences risk attitudes by 
studying when and how they may be modified by the behaviour of individuals 
physically or socially near to a subject. It also examines whether an incentive scheme 
used to improve subjects’ performance may affect their risk attitudes, either directly 
or through a change in social relationships.  
It is composed of three chapters, each one presenting the results of a different 
laboratory experiment. 
The first two chapters are based on the consideration that humans are by nature 
social creatures and that their social relationships influence their behaviour and 
choices. They study whether an individual’s social network is also capable of 
changing their risk behaviour, and provide new evidence that individual risk 
behaviour is influenced by the risk behaviour of the person’s peer group. They also 
offer one explanation for why peer effects are not always present and vary in 
intensity. This is due to the fact that individuals are more influenced by peers with 
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whom they feel more bonded. Specifically, in the first chapter I study how group 
identity (that is, the portion of an individual’s self-concept derived from the sense of 
belonging to the social group) affects peer effects on risk behaviour; I find that 
individuals’ feelings of attachment to the various peers with whom they interact differ 
in intensity, and this is reflected in the extent to which their risk behaviour is 
influenced by that of their peers: a stronger group identity amplifies peer effects. The 
second chapter expands on this research, suggesting that economic interventions, 
such as the implementation of incentive schemes aimed at increasing performance, 
may alter peer relationships and thus vary the extent to which individuals are 
influenced by their peers. It compares piece-rate compensation with a cooperation-
based and with a competition-based incentive schemes, showing that competition 
significantly reduces attachment to peers and more than halves peer influence on risk 
behaviour when compared with piece-rate compensation; however, the latter effect is 
not statistically significant. Such findings suggest that the strength of social 
relationships is an important determinant of the intensity of peer influence on 
individual behaviour. Additionally, when designing and evaluating an optimal 
compensation scheme, it may be important to also consider the possible change in 
peer attachment, and how peer effects on subsequent risk behaviour will in turn affect 
future decisions involving risk. For example, in research and development, 
incentivizing performance using competition may improve the results of current 
projects, but decisions made on the types of future projects to be attempted are 
influenced by risk attitudes; thus, the role of peers may be important. 
The third chapter restricts the attention to competition, and enquires whether 
such an incentive, widely used in education and in the labour market to improve 
performance, may in itself shape risk behaviour, beyond any social comparison, and 
whether its impact on subsequent risk behaviour is heterogeneous according to 
gender. It shows that competition does not significantly affect subsequent risk-taking 
behaviour when considering the full sample. However, there is a positive relationship 
between competition and risk aversion in males, who become more risk-averse after 
losing in the competitive environment.  
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Overall, the research conducted shows that risk attitudes are not immutable but 
may be shaped by external factors. The inborn social nature of humans renders highly 
important the role played by the risk behaviour of peers, which already begins to 
emerge when bonds are weak and which becomes stronger as the social link 
intensifies. Any policy that aims to modify risk attitudes (or that does so indirectly) 
will thus spread its effects to the peers of the target subject, and may amplify its 
success if the peer group is chosen wisely. Changes in the characteristics of subjects’ 
environment may change peer relationships. For example, the implementation of 
incentive schemes aimed at improving performance by introducing competition 
weakens subjects’ attachment to their competing peers and may attenuate peer effects 
on risk behaviour. The choice of such an incentive should therefore consider the 
spillover effect coming from a weaker peer attachment. However, competition does 
not exert a direct impact on subsequent risk behaviour, except in males who become 


































Risk is at play in many social and economic decisions, such as the choice of pathway 
in secondary school, the choice of major at university, job decisions, career 
advancements, health, marriage, parenthood, migration, eating habits, decisions 
around smoking, drug and alcohol use, criminal activity and the allocation of 
financial assets (Alexander et al., 2001; Fergusson et al., 2002; Saks and Shore, 2005; 
Belzil and Leonardi, 2007; Clark and Lohéac, 2007; Schmidt, 2008; Caner and 
Okten, 2010; Jaeger et al., 2010; Light and Ahn, 2010; Spivey, 2010; De Paola and 
Gioia, 2012). Risk attitudes are therefore an economic preference parameter that has 
attracted a great deal of attention from researchers interested in gaining a deeper 
understanding of the determinants of such decisions. 
Abandoning the traditional view of individual preferences as immutable 
personality traits (Stigler and Becker, 1977), recent research has in fact shown that 
individual risk attitudes are not exogenously given, but instead influenced by external 
factors with the potential to change them in more or less enduring ways. Among such 
factors are environmental characteristics. For example, Dohmen et al. (2012) show 
evidence of the role played by family size and birth order on the intergenerational 
transmission of risk attitudes, with firstborn children and children with fewer siblings 
being more strongly influenced by their parents. Additionally, Booth and Nolen 
(2012), in a field study, show that women’s risk preferences are influenced by the 
classroom’s gender composition.  
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Risk attitudes are also influenced by shocks and life experiences such as 
poverty, job loss or violence. Among others, Eckel et al. (2009) show that Hurricane 
Katrina evacuees exhibit risk-loving behaviour shortly after the disaster, while an 
opposite reaction is reported by Cameron and Shah (2015), who instead find that 
individuals in Indonesian villages that had suffered from a flood or an earthquake 
exhibit a long-lasting increase in risk aversion. Page et al. (2014) show higher risk-
taking behaviour among individuals whose properties were directly affected by the 
2011 Australian floods. Instead, Haushofer and Fehr (2014) point out a positive 
relationship between the psychological consequences of poverty, such as stress and 
negative affective states, and risk-averse decision-making. Similarly, Hetschko and 
Preuss (2015) find that job loss, and even the threat of job loss, make people less 
willing to take risks, although the effects are of a transitory nature. Callen et al. 
(2014) find a positive relationship between exposure to violence and a preference for 
certainty.  
Another important factor influencing individual decisions in situations 
involving risk is their emotional state: Conte et al. (2013) show that joviality, sadness, 
fear and anger instigate risk-seeking behaviour, while Campos-Vazquez and Cuilty 
(2014) find that risk aversion increases with sadness. Furthermore, Bassi et al. (2013) 
use a controlled experiment to show that sunshine and good weather increase risk-
taking in subjects.  
Finally, risk behaviour is influenced by social relationships; several papers (see, 
among others, Gardner and Steinberg, 2005; Cooper and Rege, 2011; Ahern, Duchin 
and Shumway, 2013; Bougheas, Nieboer and Sefton, 2013; Balsa, Gandelman and 
Gonzàles, 2015; Lahno and Serra-Garcia, 2015) show evidence of peer effects on 
individual decisions involving risk. This last factor proves very important because, as 
the Greek philosopher Aristotle remarked about 25 centuries ago, “man is by nature a 
social animal”; he naturally seeks interactions with others for his well-being. He 
cannot live without the social environment because it is through social interactions 
that he develops thought, language, culture and personality. Neither can he live in 
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isolation, because he cannot satisfy his mental and physical needs without the 
cooperation of his peers. His sociality is inborn. 
Individuals physically or socially near to a subject do therefore exert an 
influence on his behaviour and choices; indeed, research in many fields, including 
biology, sociology and psychology, has investigated how and why this happens. In 
recent years, there have also been a sizeable amount of economic studies 
investigating the existence of peer effects across many settings and for many 
outcomes. Peer influence has been found to play a key role in academic achievement, 
choice of college major, workers’ productivity, cheating behaviour, social outcomes, 
such as joining a fraternity, and risky behaviours, such as smoking, driving recklessly 
or committing a crime (Manski, 1993; Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003; 
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2006; Falk and Ichino, 2006; Carrell, Malmstrom 
and West, 2008; Mas and Moretti, 2009; Imberman, Kugler and Sacerdote, 2012; 
Falk, Fischbacher and Gächter, 2013). 
Despite the large literature on peer effects in socio-economic outcomes, only 
recently has research started enquiring whether the observed peer effects on final 
outcomes are indeed the result of peer influence on individual preferences and 
attitudes which, in turn, affect economic decisions. In fact, along with the cognitive 
dimension, individual preferences and attitudes, like motivation, patience, risk 
propensity or perseverance, are important determinants of socio-economic outcomes.2 
Furthermore, certain attitudes have been shown to be more malleable than cognitive 
abilities over the life cycle and up to later ages (Borghans, et al., 2008). Therefore, 
studying the extent to which peers exert an influence on individual attitudes provides 
an important contribution to the optimal design of policy interventions on the 
economic outcomes affected by such attitudes. For example, it has been shown that 
                                                          
2 The economic literature typically contrasts cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Cognitive abilities are 
defined by the American Psychological Association as "the ability to understand complex ideas, to 
adapt effectively to the environment, to learn from experience, to engage in various forms of reasoning 
and overcome obstacles by taking thought" (Neisser et al., 1996; Borghans et al., 2008). Non-cognitive 
abilities are defined as "capabilities related to a person’s personality; persisting attributes of human 
behavior, non-situational, such as self-control, self-discipline, agreeableness, self-esteem and 
conscientiousness" (Allport, 1937; Thiel and Thomsen, 2011). 
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more risk-averse individuals are more likely to go into public sector employment 
(Pfeifer, 2011). A policy intervention that wishes to foster private sector employment 
would benefit from research into peer influence on individual risk behaviour for two 
reasons. First, the existence of peer effects on risk behaviour would amplify the 
effects of the policy intervention, because it would imply that targeting the risk 
behaviour of a few individuals would generate an effect on private sector 
employment, not only for the target pool of subjects, but also for their peers. 
Moreover, the fact that peers have an influence on an individual’s risk behaviour, 
causing individuals to become more risk-seeking when they are surrounded by more 
risk-seeking peers and vice versa, would imply that a wise choice of target pool may 
amplify the benefits of the policy intervention.  
 
Thesis outline – The thesis contributes to the existing literature on the 
determinants of individual risk behaviour, both by providing new evidence on some 
of the effects already investigated in behavioural economics and by exploring new 
relationships which suggest directions for future research. It mainly focuses on peer 
effects on risk behaviour by investigating if, how and, above all, when an individual’s 
risk attitudes are influenced by the behaviour of his peers. In addition, it considers the 
incentive structure that characterizes the environment to study whether it influences 
individual risk behaviour, both directly and through changes in peers’ relationships. 
The thesis is composed of three chapters.  
The first two chapters provide new evidence that individual risk behaviour is 
influenced by the risk behaviour of their peer group, and offer one explanation as to 
why peer effects are not always present and vary in intensity. This is due to the fact 
that individuals are more influenced by peers to whom they feel more attached. Some 
recent evidence suggests that not all peers influence an individual’s behaviour, while 
some peers exert a stronger influence (Vaquera and Kao, 2008; Lomi et al., 2011; 
Borjas and Doran, 2014; Lin and Weinberg, 2014). The first chapter shows that 
individuals’ feelings of attachment to the various peers with whom they interact differ 
in intensity, and this is reflected in the extent to which they are influenced by their 
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peers’ behaviour. The second chapter digs deeper into this evidence by investigating 
the role played by the incentive structure characterizing the individuals’ environment. 
Since the first chapter shows that peer effects vary in intensity, I hypothesize that 
different types of incentive schemes may alter peer relationships and, therefore, vary 
the extent to which individuals are influenced by their peers. The research conducted 
shows that, compared with a piece-rate or a cooperation-based incentive, competition 
attenuates feelings of attachment to peers and peer influence on risk behaviour; 
however, the latter effect is not significant in statistical terms.  
Just as the research question of the second chapter arose as an extension of the 
first, the topic of the third chapter follows up on the evidence provided by the second. 
In fact, the third chapter restricts the attention to competition, the incentive scheme 
that has been shown to reduce peer influence on risk behaviour, and enquires whether 
this type of incentive has a direct effect on risk-taking behaviour, beyond any social 
comparison, and whether its impact on subsequent risk behaviour is heterogeneous 
according to gender. Therefore, while the second chapter compares different 
incentive schemes to study the differences in peer influence on risk behaviour, the 
third chapter looks only at competition, an incentive scheme widely used in education 
and in the labour market to improve performance. It studies the direct effect of 
introducing competition on individual risk-taking behaviour in an otherwise equal 
environment, in which the individuals cannot observe their peers’ risk behaviour and 
so cannot be influenced by them when making decisions involving risk. The 
contribution of the third chapter is related both to research on factors with the 
potential to influence individual risk behaviour, and to a recent strand of the literature 
explaining observed gender inequality that ascribes gender differences in socio-
economic outcomes, such as choice of field of study, job profile, occupation or 
earnings, to gender differences in attitudes and preferences. In particular, women 
have been shown to be more risk-averse than men (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; 
Croson and Gneezy, 2009) and to shy away from competition, often performing 
worse than men in competitive situations (Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2007). This evidence has been combined and suggested as an explanation 
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for the observed gender differences in the labour market (Booth and Nolen, 2012). 
We go one step further by investigating if, once competition has been introduced, its 
effect on subsequent risk behaviour, and in turn on subsequent decisions involving 
risk that may affect future productivity, differs according to gender. 
Each chapter of the thesis presents the results of a different laboratory 
experiment, in which individual risk attitudes are always measured using the Bomb 
Risk Elicitation Task - BRET (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013). This task asks 
participants to choose how many boxes to collect out of 100, knowing that 99 boxes 
contain £0.10 while one contains a bomb, but without knowing in which box the 
bomb is located. They can therefore choose their preferred lottery among the 100 
lotteries whose outcomes and probabilities are fully described only by one parameter, 
i.e., the number of collected boxes. Earnings increase linearly with the number of 
boxes collected, but they are all lost if the bomb lies in one of the collected boxes.  
In both economics and psychology, there are many experimental methods used 
to elicit risk attitudes (see Charness, Gneezy and Imas, 2013, for a review of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the most common risk elicitation methods). We use 
the BRET because of a number of appealing features, such as its short duration; ease 
of understanding, thanks to the visual representation of the game which illustrates 
probabilities and outcomes in an intuitive and transparent way; the possibility to 
precisely measure both risk aversion and risk seeking; and the absence of endogenous 
reference points. 
In the first two chapters, risk behaviour is measured both before and after the 
treatment manipulation, and feedback on peers’ ex-ante risk behaviour is used as a 
channel to study peer influence on the subject’s ex-post risk behaviour. 
 
The first chapter (Peer effects on risk behaviour: the importance of group 
identity) investigates whether and to what extent group identity plays a role in peer 
effects on risk behaviour. Psychologists define group identity as “the portion of an 
individual’s self-concept derived from the sense of belonging to the social group” 
(Hogg and Vaughan, 2002). Group membership is a ubiquitous feature of social and 
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economic life. However, groups vary enormously, as does people’s attachment to 
different social groups. In this paper, we hypothesize that the sense of belonging to a 
social group may affect the realization and magnitude of peer effects.  
Different levels of group identity are induced in a laboratory experiment 
through different matching protocols (Chen and Li, 2009). The lowest level of group 
identity is represented by a random group assignment, where subjects are randomly 
matched in pairs. Group identity is enhanced by introducing a group assignment 
protocol based on individual painting preferences, where individuals are first asked to 
express their painting preferences by choosing their favourite paintings from a set of 
five pairs of paintings; they are then matched according to their painting preferences. 
Finally, the saliency of group identity is increased by letting people interact with 
fellow group members, after being matched according to their painting preferences, 
in a group task consisting of their guessing the name of the artists responsible for two 
more paintings via an online chat application, in order to ask for help from and offer 
aid to their fellow group members.  
We find evidence of peer effects on risk behaviour, and find that they depend 
on the level of group identity: painting preferences matching significantly reduces the 
heterogeneity in risk behaviour when compared with random matching (the group’s 
standard deviation falls by 4.4 boxes collected in the BRET, about 0.54 SD). On the 
other hand, introducing a group task has no significant effect on behaviour, possibly 
because interaction does not always contribute to an enhancement of group identity. 
Indeed, we find that when group identity is likely to be stronger following peer 
interaction - because participants consider their group to be more helpful than 
average, feel more attached than average to their peers or reach an agreement on 
possible answers in the group task very quickly - the magnitude of peer effects on 
risk behaviour does increase in comparison with peers matched by painting 
preference but who do not take part in peer interaction (for example, when the peer 




Finally, the relative riskiness within the group matters and individuals tend to 
adjust their choices to converge to their peers. 
Our results showing that in an artificial social environment, i.e., a laboratory 
setting, peers affect individual risk behaviour and a less impersonal categorization 
procedure and an increased – positive – interaction with peers strengthen peer effects 
may be suggestive of an effect of the behaviour of the group of peers on individual's 
risk behaviour in the real world too. This would imply that targeting the risk 
behaviour of a few individuals might generate an effect on outcomes that have been 
found to be strongly influenced by risk, not only for the target pool of subjects but 
also for their peers. Moreover, given that the magnitude of peer effects increases as 
the individual’s closeness to the group increases, a wise choice of the target pool may 
amplify the benefits of the policy intervention.  
 
The second chapter (Incentive Schemes and Peer Effects on Risk Behaviour: 
An experiment) studies whether incentivizing performance with competition and 
cooperation-based incentive schemes, rather than just individual compensation, 
affects peer effects on subsequent risk behaviour.  
We suggest that the introduction of a competition/cooperation-based incentive 
scheme is similar to the manipulation of group identity, meaning that it may influence 
peer effects on risk behaviour: compared with working individually but surrounded 
by random co-workers, subjects may be less likely to perceive a competitor as a 
member of their group because when peers are competitors, they are working to reach 
a personal goal and only one peer will be able to meet this goal. Instead, being 
teammates may (depending on the teammates’ behaviour) increase the salience of 
peers and enhance the feeling of belonging to the peer group. In fact, with 
cooperation-based incentive schemes, like an equal-split-sharing-rule, peers work to 
reach a common goal and this enhances their group membership. However, since a 
peer’s performance/contribution to the group’s output positively affects the 
individual, peer relationships may also be weakened by a peer’s contribution not 
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meeting individual expectations, for example, because of the under provision of effort 
due to free-riding.  
We answer our research question by running a laboratory experiment in which 
we introduce three different incentive schemes, namely piece-rate, equal-split-
sharing-rule and tournament, as the compensation rule governing a real effort task 
that consists of recognizing the value and country of origin of Euro coins, performed 
between the ex-ante and ex-post elicitation of risk behaviour. We again find evidence 
of peer effects on risk behaviour. Peer influence is very similar in size under the 
piece-rate and cooperation-based compensation schemes (for each additional box 
collected in the first performance of the BRET by their peer, individuals increase 
their choice in the second performance of the BRET by about 0.20 boxes under the 
piece-rate and 0.17 boxes under the cooperation-based incentive schemes), while it is 
more than halved when performance is incentivized using competition (0.06 boxes), 
although this difference is not significant in statistical terms. Importantly, after 
competing with them, participants feel significantly less attached to their peer than 
after the implementation of both the piece-rate (-1.15 on a 0 to 10 scale) and 
cooperation-based compensation schemes (-1.72). Additionally, tournaments 
significantly attenuate self-reported peer influence compared with the other two 
compensation schemes (-17 percentage points vs piece-rate and -27 percentage points 
vs cooperation-based incentives). Finally, we find that relative performance in the 
incentivized task matters in terms of peer effects on subsequent risk behaviour, and 
that while the worst performing subjects within the group are influenced by their 
peers, the best performing subjects are not. 
Our findings support the evidence of peer effects on risk behaviour, which are 
important from a policy perspective because in several environments policy-makers 
or private companies may be interested in influencing individuals’ choices involving 
risk, and peer effects may amplify the effects of such interventions because they will 
spread them to peers as well. Our focus on if and how incentives influence peer 
effects on risk behaviour - and, in turn, subsequent decisions influenced by risk 
attitudes - allows us to understand both whether policy interventions that benefit from 
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the multiplying effect of peer influence may still be successfully implemented under 
different incentive schemes, how to design the optimal compensation scheme and 
whether to base its evaluation only on performance. 
 
The third chapter (Competition and subsequent risk-taking behaviour: 
heterogeneity across gender and outcomes) studies whether competition shapes 
subsequent risk behaviour and if such an effect is heterogeneous according to gender.  
Competition is important in a wide range of economic decisions and is seldom a 
one-shot phenomenon, as individuals face many situations involving competitive 
pressure and make relevant decisions even after the competition is over. Therefore, 
besides its short-run effects on performance, competitive pressure may induce other 
effects, such as changes in risk behaviour, with the potential to affect subsequent 
decisions, adding to its long-run impact. Subjects may change their risk attitude after 
competitive endeavours for many reasons, such as experiences of stress or of 
different emotions and social comparison due to competition, which induces ex-post 
inequality and makes relative payoff concerns salient.  
We investigate the causal effect of competition on subsequent risk-taking 
behaviour by running a lab experiment eliciting the risk attitudes of a sample of 
subjects who have performed a real effort task, which consists of recognizing the 
value and country of origin of Euro coins, exogenously manipulated in terms of the 
degree of competitiveness. We design the experiment in order to carefully control for 
wealth effects, isolating the pure effect of competition at the individual level and 
excluding social comparison considerations. 
We find that, overall, subjects display more risk-averse behaviour after a 
competition yielding either a high or a low payoff than after receiving the same 
payoffs randomly (on average, they collect about 4 boxes less after competing, 0.24 
SD). However, this positive relationship between competition and risk aversion is not 
statistically significant.  
Since males and females have been shown to have different levels of fondness 
for competition (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), they may experience the 
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competition differently; so, potential effects on subsequent risk behaviour may be 
different across gender. The analysis of gender heterogeneity shows that, while 
females’ behaviour is not affected by competition or its outcomes, males become 
more risk-averse after losing in the competitive environment (they collect on average 
9 boxes less than in the baseline). On the other hand, there is no evidence of a 
symmetric increase in risk-seeking behaviour after winning the tournament. We 
acknowledge that, given our design, the outcome-dependent evidence is only 
suggestive. However, we interpret our findings in terms of males’ reaction to negative 
outcomes, driven by intrinsic motives. One possible explanation is that the negative 
outcome may arouse emotions that, in turn, affect subsequent decisions under risk. 
Alternatively, the negative outcome may induce a shift in the locus of control. Losing 
may reduce the extent to which one believes that he can predict or influence future 
events and this may, in turn, increase risk aversion. When losing in a competitive 
task, males might even be inclined to project their inability to control events onto 
subsequent decisions involving merely random outcomes. Identifying, in a controlled 
manner, the ultimate cause for which losing a competitive endeavour increases males’ 
risk aversion constitutes an interesting goal for future research, together with further 
investigation into the future and indirect consequences of competition, over and 
above its immediate effect on productivity. 
 
The evidence presented adds to the literature demonstrating that individual risk 
attitudes are not immutable, but are shaped by external factors. Specifically, it 
highlights the role played by the risk behaviour of peers, showing that peer influence 
already begins to emerge when bonds are weak and becomes stronger as the social 
link intensifies. Any policy oriented towards modifying risk attitudes (or that does so 
indirectly) will thus spread its effects to the target subjects’ peers, and may amplify 
its success if the peer group is chosen wisely. A change in the characteristics of the 
environment due to the introduction of competition weakens subjects’ attachment to 
their competing peers and may attenuate peer influence on risk behaviour. Moreover, 
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competition per se has no direct impact on subsequent risk behaviour, except for 
males who become more risk-averse after losing. 
Investigating whether the influence of group identity, along with other changes 
in the subjects’ environment, on how peers affect risk behaviour is heterogeneous 
along both gender and ability dimensions, as well as the size and composition of the 
peer group, appear to be fruitful directions for future research. Furthermore, domains 
























Peer Effects on Risk Behaviour:  





This paper investigates whether and to what extent group identity plays a role in peer effects 
on risk behaviour. We run a laboratory experiment in which different levels of group identity 
are induced through different matching protocols (random or based on individual painting 
preferences) and the possibility to interact with group members via an online chat in a group 
task. Risk behaviour is measured by using the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task and peer influence 
is introduced by giving subjects feedback regarding group members’ previous decisions. We 
find that subjects are affected by their peers when taking decisions and that group identity 
influences the magnitude of peer effects: painting preferences matching significantly reduces 
the heterogeneity in risk behaviour compared with random matching. On the other hand, 
introducing a group task has no significant effect on behaviour, possibly because interaction 
does not always contribute to enhance group identity. Finally, relative riskiness within the 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The question of whether and how peers influence an individual’s behaviour has been 
widely investigated in economics literature. Considerable evidence suggests that 
individuals who are physically or socially close to a subject influence his/her 
behaviour and choices. Peers’ influence has been studied in the context of academic 
achievement, choice of university degree course, worker productivity, cheating 
behaviour and social outcomes such as joining student societies (Manski, 1993; 
Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2006; Falk and 
Ichino, 2006; Carrell, Malmstrom and West, 2008; Mas and Moretti, 2009; 
Imberman, Kugler and Sacerdote, 2012; Falk, Fischbacher and Gächter, 2013).  
Peer effects have also often been mentioned as a leading explanation for why 
people engage in risk taking activities such as smoking (Alexander et al., 2001), drug 
and alcohol use (Fergusson et al., 2002; Duncan et al., 2005; Powell et al., 2005; 
Lundborg, 2006; Clark and Lohéac, 2007), criminal activity (Fergusson et al., 2002; 
Bayer et al., 2009), financial decisions (Kelly and O’Grada, 2000; Hong et al., 2004; 
Brown et al., 2008; Bursztyn et al., 2014; Cai et al., 2015) and entrepreneurship 
decisions (Nanda and Sørensen, 2010; Falck et al., 2012; Lerner and Malmendier, 
2013).  
Despite their relevance for many social and economic interactions, little is 
known about the circumstances triggering peer effects. In this paper, we investigate 
the role of group identity, which psychologists define as “the portion of an 
individual’s self-concept derived from the sense of belonging to the social group” 
(Hogg and Vaughan, 2002). Group membership is a ubiquitous feature of social and 
economic life. However, groups vary enormously and so does people’s attachment to 
different social groups. We hypothesize that the sense of belonging to a social group 
may affect the realization and magnitude of peer effects.  
Since the introduction of the minimal group paradigm by Tajfel (1970) and the 
subsequent development of the social identity theory (Billig and Tajfel, 1973), 
different levels of group identity have been introduced to understand how and why 
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people behave differently towards those that they share a common identity with. In 
particular, numerous studies document that people tend to behave more prosocially 
when they interact with members of their own group, but become less generous, less 
trusting, and less cooperative towards individuals who belong to different groups 
(Tajfel et al. 1971; Götte, Huffman and Meier, 2006; Charness, Rigotti and 
Rustichini, 2007; Chen and Li, 2009). 
The goal of this paper is to study whether and to what extent group identity 
plays a role in peer effects on risk behaviour. Some recent evidence suggests that not 
all peers matter and some matter more than others (Vaquera and Kao, 2008; Lomi et 
al., 2011; Lin and Weinberg, 2014; Borjas and Doran, 2015). The sense of belonging 
to a group may be a possible explanation for this finding: individuals may only be 
affected by social groups they feel they belong to and the peers they are particularly 
attached to may matter more than other peers. Knowing that group identity is one of 
the mechanisms triggering peer effects may help the design of policy interventions 
the benefits of which may be increased by choosing the target peer group wisely. 
Also, considering that risk is at play in a large range of social economic decisions, 
such as choice of career, university degree course or study effort (Saks and Shore, 
2005; Belzil and Leonardi, 2007; Caner and Okten, 2010; De Paola and Gioia, 2012), 
and that recent evidence shows that an individual’s risk behaviour is shaped by the 
behaviour of others in the immediate social environment, studying the role that group 
identity has in an individual’s decision-making when faced with risk would appear to 
be especially worthwhile. To our knowledge, we are the first to look at the degree of 
group identity as a determinant of the strength of peer effects.  
In this paper, we use procedures commonly used in the literature to induce 
different levels of group identity (Tajfel, 1970; Chen and Li, 2009) with the aim of 
investigating the impact of group identity on the magnitude of peer effects on an 
individual’s decisions in a risky setting. 
We run a laboratory experiment with 255 students. We measure individual risk 
behaviour by using the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task, an easy task in which subjects 
have to choose how many boxes to collect out of 100, 99 of which contain £0.10 
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while one contains a bomb. Earnings increase linearly with the number of boxes 
collected, but are zero if the bomb is collected. Peer influence is introduced by 
providing subjects with feedback on fellow group members’ decisions in the 
immediately preceding performance of the task. 
The experiment consists of a control group and four treatments. One treatment, 
called Anchoring treatment, is meant to distinguish peer effects from anchoring 
effects that may arise if the change in individual behaviour is driven by the exposure 
to numbers rather than by a desire to be similar to assigned peers. The other three 
treatments introduce a different level of group identity. The Random treatment 
matches individuals into groups of three at random. The Painting treatment 
introduces a less impersonal matching: individuals are first asked to express their 
painting preferences, by choosing their favourite paintings from within five pairs of 
paintings, and then are matched according to their painting preferences. Finally, the 
Chat treatment matches individuals according to their painting preferences and entails 
a group task which consists of their guessing the name of the artists responsible for 
two more paintings by using an online chat to ask for help from and offer aid to their 
fellow group members. This additional task is meant to enhance the level of 
perceived group identity by letting people interact with fellow group members more. 
We find evidence of peer effects in risk behaviour and find that they depend on 
the level of group identity. Individuals who are assigned to groups based on their 
painting preferences are more likely to conform to their peers than the control group 
(the group standard deviation falls by 8.5 boxes collected in the BRET) and the 
anchoring treatment (-7.8 boxes). Also, enhancing the level of group identity, by 
making people aware that they have the same painting preferences as their peers, 
significantly increases (by about 4.4 boxes) peer effects beyond those produced 
through a random group assignment. While peer effects remain statistically 
significant when a difference-in-differences model is estimated, the size of the 
increase in the effect due to the less impersonal matching protocol based on a shared 
preference becomes smaller and no longer significant at conventional levels. 
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The chat treatment, which combines a preferences-based matching with a group 
task, does not induce significantly different peer effects from those found for the 
painting treatment (-7.8 boxes). We speculate that this may be because the group task 
has a different effect on perceived group identity as a consequence of the individual 
experience in the task. Indeed, we find that when interaction in the group task 
contributes to the enhancing of group identity, the magnitude of peer effects on risk 
behaviour does increase in comparison with the painting treatment. For example, with 
regard the control group, groups in the chat treatment whose participants consider 
their group to be more helpful than the average significantly reduce their 
heterogeneity in risk behaviour by 5.2 boxes more than groups in the chat treatment 
who do not find their group very helpful, and by 3.8 boxes more than groups in the 
painting treatment. Similar results are found for groups whose participants feel more 
attached than the average to their peers or reach an agreement on the possible answers 
in the group task very quickly.  
The relative position of the individual within the group in terms of risk 
behaviour plays an important role in the individual’s decisions when receiving 
feedback about peers’ previous decisions. Individuals whose peers are riskier than 
they are tend to increase their choice by 12.3 boxes compared with individuals with 
mixed peers, while individuals whose peers are less risky than they are tend to 
decrease it on average by 5.5 boxes. When ruling out the component of the effect due 
to regression to the mean, peers’ risk behaviour continues to play a significant role 
for bottom ranked individuals (+6.9 boxes, significant at the 1 percent level) while 
the effect is negative but very close to zero for top ranked individuals (-1 box). 
However, the increase in risk aversion experienced by top ranked individuals goes in 
the opposite direction and more than offsets the tendency to decrease risk aversion 
when performing the risk elicitation task for the second time that emerges in the 
literature and in our data. Instead, the increase in risk-seeking behaviour due to 




The paper is structured in five parts. Section 1.2 presents a brief overview of 
the related literature. In section 1.3, we describe our experimental design. Section 1.4 
presents our empirical analysis. Section 1.5 concludes. 
 
 
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This paper combines three different branches of economics and psychology literature: 
research investigating the extent to which an individual’s behaviour is modified by 
his/her peers; research looking at the determinants of risk behaviour; research into the 
development of a group identity and its effects. Only a few very recent papers 
integrate the literature on peer effects and the literature on risk attitudes to look at the 
role played by peers in an individual's risk behaviour, but no one induces different 
levels of group affiliation as we did.  
Gardner and Steinberg (2005) investigate the impact of peers on the orientation 
towards risk of different age groups and find that, on average, individuals are more 
risk seeking when in the company of their peers than when alone and that peer 
influence plays a stronger role in explaining risky behaviour among adolescents and 
youths than it does among adults. Unlike our study, the authors do not use 
incentivized tasks, but pay a fixed fee and, instead of giving feedback on peers’ 
choices, they let peers work together or intervene when other peers are working. 
More importantly, they investigate the emergence of peer effects in a setting with a 
very high level of group identity because they require participants to invite two 
people they know of the same gender to the session and let these three people 
constitute a peer group.  
Cooper and Rege (2011) show the existence of peer group effects in a series of 
binary choices under risk and ambiguity by using feedback about the choices made 
by other subjects as the channel for peer influence. They find that peer effects in risk 
behaviour may be explained by social regret, that is an individual decides to behave 
similarly to his/her peers because s/he experiences a lower loss in utility from not 
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taking an action that would have led to higher payoffs ex post if his/her peers have 
also not taken that action. In our experiment, social regret is ruled out by design as a 
possible cause of peer effects because participants never choose from among the 
same lotteries. Thus even when choosing the same action, they might end up with 
different payoffs. Moreover, participants have all the time they need to make their 
decision in our setting, while time pressure might play a role in Cooper and Rege’s 
experiments because, if subjects do not take a choice within about one minute, it is 
randomly taken by the computer.3  
Another experimental paper investigating peer effects on risk behaviour is by 
Lahno and Serra-Garcia (2015). They use binary lottery choices as a task to be 
performed to test for two causes of peer effects, utility from payoff differences and 
utility from conforming to peers, and show that peer effects are mainly explained by 
the former and that responses to peers’ decisions depend on whether peers’ choices 
are voluntary or randomly imposed by the experimenter. As in our experiment, they 
use feedback on the peers’ decision as the channel for peer influence; however, while 
we rule out relative payoff concerns by design, their focus is on the direct impact of 
payoff differences.  
Evidence of peer effects on risk behaviour is also found by Bougheas, Nieboer 
and Sefton (2013), who use a laboratory experiment to study the importance of two 
channels, consultation and feedback, for peer interaction, rather than the causes of 
peer effects, and by Balsa, Gandelman and Gonzàles (2015) and Ahern, Duchin and 
Shumway (2013), who use survey data on adolescents and MBA students, 
respectively. Finally, Trautmann and Vieider (2012) present an overview of social 
influences on economic decisions under risk.  
The other strand of literature this paper refers to, is the literature on group 
identity. There are two main experimental methods used to study social identity in 
social psychology: priming natural social identities and artificially inducing group 
                                                          
3 The psychology and economics literature shows that time pressure is detrimental for decision quality 
(Diederich, 1997; Busemeyer and Diederich, 2002; Diederich and Busemeyer, 2003) and for 




identities. We decided in favour of induced group identities because our aim is to 
look at the effect of an increase in perceived social identity on peer group influence 
effects on risk behaviour. Priming would make it difficult both to create increasingly 
stronger group identities and to separate the effect of a stronger group identity per se 
from the meaning attached to the primed identity.4 
The literature which induces different levels of group identity has typically used 
the minimal group paradigm, that is it has categorized people into some groups 
according to some trivial criterion, such as visual judgements (estimating the number 
of dots flashed onto a screen) or painting preferences (choosing between Klee or 
Kandinsky paintings), and has further increased the saliency of the group by 
introducing payoff communality and interaction among group members (Charness, 
Rigotti, and Rustichini, 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Güth, Ploner, and Regner, 2009; 
Sutter, 2009; Arora et al., 2012).  
This literature has mainly studied the role of social categorization in inter-group 
discrimination and social preferences and has shown that individuals who are 
assigned to novel social categories discriminate in favour of their own category. 
There are no studies that focus on the role of risk behaviour and use a setting where 
the individual decides just for himself and not for the other participants.  
Among the main papers which study the effect of inducing a greater sense of 
group identity, Chen and Li (2009) look at social preferences and find that individuals 
are both more charitable and less envious towards members of the same group than 
towards people from outside the group and both more likely to reward a fellow group 
member vs an outsider for good behaviour and less likely to punish him/her for 
misbehaviour. Moreover, social welfare maximizing decisions are more likely when 
subjects are matched with fellow group members. Charness et al. (2007) show that 
                                                          
4 Research using the priming method has shown that making different natural social identities salient 
through priming can affect outcomes, such as test performance or walking speed (Steele and Aronson, 
1995; Shih, Pittinsky, and Ambady, 1999; Spencer, Steele and Quinn, 1999; Fershtman and Gneezy, 
2001; Yopyk and Prentice, 2005; Bernhard, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2006; Götte et al., 2006; Bargh, 
2006; McLeish and Oxoby, 2011). However, the priming method may lack some of the desired control 
over the experimental situation and conclusions drawn from using this method may be hampered by 




participants act more aggressively to the benefit of their group and at the expense of 
outsiders as identity becomes more salient. Similarly, Arora et al. (2012) find that 
increases in group affiliation are accompanied by higher levels of cooperation, 
personal satisfaction and trust in one’s group.  
 
 
1.3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
The individual level of risk aversion is measured by using the Bomb Risk Elicitation 
Task – BRET (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013). This method measures risk behaviour by 
having subjects choose how many boxes to collect out of 100,  99 of which contain 
£0.10 while one contains a bomb. 
In both Economics and Psychology, there are a variety of experimental methods 
for eliciting and assessing risk behaviour (see Charness, Gneezy and Imas, 2013, for a 
review of advantages and disadvantages of the most common risk elicitation 
methods). We use the BRET because of a number of appealing features. First, its 
duration is very short and it can even be run with paper and pencil, which would 
allow the repetition of our experiment in the field where access to a computer is 
limited. This could prove very interesting given that field work would allow 
observation of levels of group identity that are very close to real-life ones. Second, 
the BRET is very easy to understand thanks to the visual representation of the game 
which illustrates probabilities and outcomes intuitively and transparently. Simple 
methods are most useful in studies like ours which try to capture treatment effects and 
differences in individual risk preferences (Charness, Gneezy and Imas, 2013). 
Moreover, the absence of complexity from the task should reduce the extent to which 
social learning drives peer effects on individual risk behaviour within our setting.5 
                                                          
5 Social interaction may influence individual behaviour for many reasons. We do not aim to identify 
the specific mechanism at work in our setting however the most likely one is conformism, the act of 
changing one’s behaviour to match the responses of others (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Asch, 1955). 
If conformism is at work, the extent to which individuals like to behave similarly to their peers may be 
stronger, the deeper the sense of belonging to the group is. The scope for social learning is reduced to a 
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Finally, compared with other well-known tasks in the literature, the BRET allows 
precise measurement of both risk aversion and risk seeking, is defined entirely in the 
gain domain and does not provide any endogenous reference point, thus avoiding the 
presence of loss aversion as a potential confounding factor.6 
We induce different levels of group identity following a procedure, similar to 
the one used by Chen and Li (2009) to study social preferences, that combines two 
assignment methods (random and based on painting preferences) and a collective 
problem solving task using an online chat program to enhance feelings of belonging 




We conducted the experiment in April 2014 through computers at the Behavioural 
Laboratory at the University of Edinburgh (BLUE) and programmed it by using z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The experiment consists of four treatments and a control. 
We ran three sessions for each of the treatments and for the control. Each session was 
divided into three parts and the treatment protocol (group matching and feedback on 
group decisions) was introduced for the second and third parts.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
minimum by our design and if it plays any role, given that the available information on peer behaviour 
is the same, its effect is plausibly similar across group identity treatments. Social utility in the form of 
relative payoff concerns and, thus, potential feelings of envy or guilt (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) is 
unlikely in our setting because there is no direct spillover across individuals’ payoffs and, even if they 
make the same choice, there is a very low probability of their earning the same payoff. Participants do 
not directly interact before performing the task, so there are no knowledge spillovers that involve 
direct sharing of information. Moreover, individuals and groups are anonymous, therefore there is no 
way of expressing approval or disapproval which might give rise to a social norm and there is no social 
pressure arising from the fear of being alone, marginalized by the peer group and/or considered 
"different". 
6 Moreover, unlike other risk elicitation methods, such as the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et 
al., 2002), there is no truncation of data in the BRET. 
7 By comparing different treatments, Chen and Li (2009) find that, on one hand, random assignment is 
as effective as group assignment based on participant painting preferences in inducing group identity; 
on the other hand, the group task using the online chat significantly increases the self-reported 
attachment to the group and might have a moderate effect on behaviour. The authors also introduce 
other-other allocation tasks and find that they have no significant effect. Based on these results and on 
the authors' concern that the group effect induced by categorization may deteriorate over time, we 
decide not to introduce the other-other allocation tasks and to reduce the length of the chat in the group 
task from 10 to 5 minutes. 
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Participants were recruited using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2015). A total 
of 255 students participated in the experiment, distributed over 15 sessions of about 
35 to 40 minutes each. 
Upon entering the laboratory, we randomly assigned participants to a computer. 
Then, we read aloud the introductory instructions to the experiment, which were also 
displayed on the participants’ computer screens. We gave detailed instructions at the 
beginning of each part and, when needed, before each relevant step in the experiment. 
On each occasion, after reading the instructions, we gave individuals some time to 
ask clarifying questions.  
Participants always had to perform the same task: the Bomb Risk Elicitation 
Task (BRET). In both parts I and II of the experiment, participants performed the 
BRET once. They performed the BRET 10 times in part III of the experiment. 
When playing the BRET, subjects see a square on their PC screen formed of 
10x10 cells which represent the 100 boxes that they can collect (see Figure 1). They 
have to choose how many boxes to collect and write down their chosen number.8 
They can therefore choose their preferred lottery among 100 lotteries whose 
outcomes and probabilities are fully described by just one parameter, i.e. the number 
of collected boxes.  
 
[Figure 1 Here] 
 
Earnings increase linearly with the number of boxes collected, but participants are 
warned that their earnings are provisional. In fact, they know that one box contains a 
bomb without knowing which box this is.  
Boxes are collected in numerical order starting from number 1 in the top left 
hand corner and continuing until the number of boxes chosen by the subject is 
                                                          
8 We asked participants to write the same number twice and to confirm their choice in order to avoid 




reached. While reading the instructions, we display a dynamic visual representation 
of the game on the main screen to show the order of collection.  
If a participant collects the bomb, s/he earns zero. If s/he collects a number of 
boxes inferior to the number of the box containing the bomb (i.e. s/he does not collect 
the bomb), s/he obtains £0.10 for each collected box. After confirming their decision, 
participants see the square of boxes on their screen. This shows the collected boxes in 
light grey and a message with the potential earnings in both situations (if the bomb is 
collected or not). Figure 2 shows the computer screen for a participant who chose to 
collect 35 boxes.9  
Participants are allowed to play a practice round before the beginning of the 
experiment. This practice round gives them an opportunity to make sure they 
understand the rules, the types of decisions they will make and how these will affect 
their earnings. The trial period, however, does not end with the draw of the bomb’s 
position so as to avoid providing subjects with a reference point regarding the bomb’s 
position.  
 
[Figure 2 Here] 
 
At the end of the experiment, participants completed a short questionnaire. Then, one 
of their decisions and the position of the bomb were selected by separate random 
                                                          
9 We decided in favour of a static version of the BRET to avoid individual levels of impatience 
affecting participants’ decisions and, thus, our indicator of risk behaviour (in the dynamic version of 
the BRET, one cell is automatically deleted from the screen each second, to represent a collected box, 
and subjects have to wait while the deletion process goes on until their chosen number of boxes have 
been collected. Even when the time interval between the deletion of the cells is reduced, this 
mechanism always entails an element of patience whereby a high level of risk aversion might reflect 
lower patience and vice versa). Nevertheless, given that Crosetto and Filippin (2013) point out higher 
comprehension problems in the static version, in order to be sure that a participants’ decision was not 
driven by confusion or imperfect comprehension of outcomes and probabilities, we also introduced a 
dynamic visual representation of the collection process when explaining the rules of the task and a 
visual representation of the boxes collected and uncollected after each decision. 
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draws carried out at the individual level. 10  The selected decision and the 
corresponding earnings were shown on the computer screen together with the 
selected bomb position. We paid out total earnings (including a show-up fee of £3) in 
cash at the end of the experiment. We called participants individually on the basis of 
their computer number and they went into another room, signed a receipt and 
received their earnings in an envelope. Average earnings for participant were £5.45 




We exogenously sorted the experiment participants into a control group, a treatment 
group (Anchoring) designed to distinguish between anchoring effects 11  and peer 
effects12 and three treatment groups (Random, Painting, Chat) designed to increase 
group identity. 
Table 1 describes the main features of our treatments. There are 51 participants 
in the control group; 48 in the random and chat treatments and 54 in the anchoring 
and painting treatments. 
 
[Table 1 Here] 
 
Participants in the random treatment are randomly matched into groups of three.  
In the painting treatment, the matching is based on individual preferences: 
individuals are shown five pairs of paintings and have to choose their favourite 
                                                          
10 We decided to determine the position of the bomb individually because recent evidence on the 
BRET (Crosetto and Filippin, 2017) shows that there seem to be peer effects when the random draw is 
carried out once for the whole lab rather than individually.  
11 According to Tversky and Kahneman (1974) the anchoring effect is the disproportionate influence 
on decision makers to make judgments that are biased toward an initially presented value. The 
anchoring effect has been studied in different domains, such as valuations and purchasing decisions 
(Wansink et al., 1998; Mussweiler et al., 2000; Ariely et al., 2003). See Furnham and Boo (2011) for a 
review. 
12 The sessions of the Anchoring treatment were conducted in October 2015. 
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painting within each pair. In each pair, one painting is by Klee and one is by 
Kandinsky (individuals are not told who the artists are).13 After having chosen their 
favourite paintings, they are classified as either a “Kandinsky fan” or a “Klee fan”: an 
individual prefers Klee to Kandinsky if in at least three out of the five pairs s/he 
chooses Klee rather than Kandinsky, and vice versa. Then, subjects sharing the same 
painting preferences are assigned to groups of three and receive information about the 
painting preferences of all the members of their group.14 
The chat treatment is very similar to the painting treatment. The only difference 
is that, after being matched into groups of three based on their painting preferences 
and before performing the BRET again with information, individuals in the chat 
treatment have to perform a group task. Subjects are shown two additional paintings15 
and are given five minutes to exchange information on the artists who produced the 
two paintings with fellow group members via an online chat program in order to 
choose the right answers. After the chat, they have to choose individually the artist 
responsible for each of such two additional paintings. Each correct answer is worth 
£1. The outcome of this task is only known at the end of the experiment together with 
the earnings from the selected decision.16  
At the end of the experiment, after having completed the questionnaire, subjects 
in the painting and chat treatments received the answer key with the names of the 
artists who produced all the paintings. 
Participants in the control group and in the anchoring treatment are not assigned 
to groups. A random matching is carried out simply for the purposes of analysis. The 
                                                          
13 As in Chen and Li (2009), the five pairs of paintings are: 1A Gebirgsbildung, 1924, by Klee; 1B 
Subdued Glow, 1928, by Kandinsky; 2A Dreamy Improvisation, 1913, by Kandinsky; 2B Warning of 
the Ships, 1917, by Klee; 3A Dry-Cool Garden, 1921, by Klee; 3B Landscape with Red Splashes I, 
1913, by Kandinsky; 4A Gentle Ascent, 1934, by Kandinsky; 4B A Hoffmannesque Tale, 1921, by 
Klee; 5A Development in Brown, 1933, by Kandinsky; 5B The Vase, 1938, by Klee. 
14 Having the three group members sharing the same painting preferences has not always been possible 
owing to the number of fans of each artist within the sessions being not a multiple of three. Three 
groups have only two members sharing the same painting preferences while the third member is a fan 
of the other artist.  
15 As in Chen and Li (2009) the two additional paintings are: Monument in Fertile Country, 1929, by 
Klee and Start, 1928, by Kandinsky. 
16 56.25 percent of the participants provided correct answers to both paintings; 6.25 percent provided 
one correct answer and 37.5 percent provided zero correct answers. 
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presence of a group to which they have been assigned is never communicated to 
subjects.  
The first part of each session is the same for all groups: participants in all 
treatments and the control group play the BRET individually once. The treatment 
protocol is introduced in part II of the experimental session and is also present in part 
III. Thus, in parts II and III, participants in the control group perform the BRET under 
the same conditions as in part I. Instead, participants in the random, chat and painting 
treatments perform the BRET after receiving information about the number of boxes 
that each member of the group decided to collect on the previous occasion that the 
BRET was performed. Instructions make it clear to subjects that their payoffs depend 
solely on their own choices, not on the choices of other subjects. The information on 
choices made previously by group members is displayed both on the waiting screen 
before the main BRET screen and in the top right corner of the main BRET screen 
(above the fields where the participants have to write the number of boxes they would 
like to collect). The members assigned to a group in part II are still in the same group 
in part III.17 
The anchoring treatment is similar to the control group because, in parts II and 
III, subjects perform the BRET under the same conditions as in part I. However, as in 
the other treatments, subjects see the previous choice of a - randomly assigned - peer 
group. Since the goal of the anchoring treatment is to distinguish the simple hint 
received from numbers from the willingness to be similar to assigned peers, 
information on peers’ previous choices is given through a different task where 
numbers are shown without reference to peers and subjects are not told that they are 
part of a group. Thus, participants in the anchoring treatment are asked about their 
painting preferences before performing the BRET. They are told that one hundred 
                                                          
17 Since one of the aims of inducing a growing sense of group identity is to extrapolate our insights 
into the real world, where people often self-select into groups, we could have added another treatment 
requiring participants to invite two other people (maybe of the same gender) to the session and let 
these three people constitute a peer group, as in Gardner and Steinberg (2005). We decided not to 
introduce such a treatment because people in our setting do not know that they will be matched into 
groups until they are actually assigned to groups (part II). People invited to come with friends may 
presume that part or all of the experiment will involve some interaction with their friends and this may 
condition their behaviour, even in part I when they perform individually.  
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paintings by different artists have been selected (and are numbered from 1 to 100) 
and that they are going to see either two or three of these paintings, selected at 
random.18 They have to choose their favourite painting and will be informed about 
their preferred artist. The numbers of the selected paintings (that correspond to the 
previous BRET choices of a randomly assigned peer group) are displayed on both the 
waiting screen before the painting preferences elicitation and the feedback screen, 
which informs subjects of their favourite artist, coming immediately before the new 




1.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
1.4.1 Summary Statistics 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for our indicator of risk behaviour and the 
dependent variable used to study peer effects, across treatment and control groups, 
before and after the implementation of the treatment protocol. It also reports two-
sample t-tests for the equality of variable means between each treatment and the 
control group and an F-test for the equality of variable means across all groups. In 
this section and in the main analysis, we focus on just parts I and II of each 
experimental session in order to avoid the well known reflection problem (Manski, 
1993) in estimating non-biased peer effects.19 We analyse data from part III in section 
1.4.4. 
[Table 2 Here] 
 
                                                          
18 Instructions stated “either two or three paintings” because, if two of the previous choices were the 
same, subjects saw only two paintings. A case in which all three made the same choice did not occur. 
19  The reflection problem arises when peers interact repeatedly because if an individual’s choice 




The variable Choice represents the number of boxes that each student decides to 
collect and, therefore, his/her risk behaviour.  
In part I, where all subjects perform the task without being assigned to groups, 
the average number of collected boxes in the whole sample is 41.6. The majority of 
subjects (64.3%) display risk averse behaviour (i.e. choose a number of boxes below 
50); 12.6% of the sample is risk neutral and the remaining 23.1% choose to collect 
more than 50 boxes, thus displaying risk seeking behaviour.20 When looking at the 
average choice for the treatment and control groups separately, we see that the 
random treatment has the lowest average number of collected boxes (38) and that the 
anchoring and painting treatment have the highest average choice (about 43) while 
the control group and the chat treatment lie somewhere in the middle. Importantly, 
there are no significant differences across treatment and control groups in terms of 
subjects’ risk behaviour in part I.21 
In line with the findings of Crosetto and Filippin (2013), when subjects perform 
the task for a second time in part II, after being grouped and having had information 
on the choices made in part I by fellow group members, the average number of 
collected boxes overall (43.8) is significantly higher than in part I 22  (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test p-value=0.0107) and subjects’ behaviour is slightly less risk averse: 
about 61% is risk averse in part II, 14.5% is risk neutral and 24.5% is risk seeking. 
There are no significant treatment differences in the average choice in part II. A 
deeper analysis of the subjects’ risk behaviour is presented in section 1.4.5. 
To check the reliability of our variable Choice as a measure of individual’s risk 
behaviour, we compute its correlation with self-reported indicators of risk attitudes 
                                                          
20 See Crosetto and Filippin (2013) for details on how to formalize subjects’ decisions in the BRET. 
21 We present our randomization checks in Appendix A. Table A1 shows no systematic differences in 
any of the individual characteristics, including those that could be correlated with risk taking behaviour 
outside the lab, such as smoking. We also performed additional tests that confirm the absence of ex 
ante heterogeneity in risk behaviour across treatment and control groups (a two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions and an Epps-Singleton two-sample empirical 
characteristic function test). Similarly, the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test 
confirms the absence of significant difference in the choice in part I between any two groups. (Results 
not reported and available upon request). 
22 The same results hold true when we regress the number of collected boxes on the dummy for part II. 
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derived from answers to some questions from the final questionnaire: the general risk 
question used in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)23, that is “On a 0-10 
scale, how do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to 
take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?”, and similar domain-specific risk 
questions. We create risk indicators for both the general risk question and each of the 
domain-specific questions. These variables take values from 0 to 10 and increase with 
the propensity to take risk. We find that our measure Choice is positively and 
significantly (corr=0.2714, p-value=0.000) correlated in part I with the indicator of 
general risk attitudes.24  Moreover, we find evidence of a positive and significant 
correlation between our variable and the domain-specific risk indicators for all the 
domains: driving or cycling, financial matters, leisure and sport, occupation, studies, 
health, faith in other people (correlation and significance vary depending on the 
domain. The highest level of correlation is for occupation – corr=0.2018, p-
value=0.001 – and the lowest is for leisure and sport – corr=0.109, p-value=0.082).  
Our main variable of interest is the standard deviation of the number of boxes 
chosen within a group (“GroupSD”). The higher GroupSD is, the higher 
heterogeneity within the group is. Since this variable is computed at the group level, 
                                                          
23 The validity of using the self-reported general risk question as opposed to the results of incentivized 
lottery-based tasks to elicit risk attitudes has been explored by Dohmen et al. (2011), who show that 
self-reported answers can represent a valid low-cost substitute for incentivized lottery schemes. 
24 The correlation coefficients are higher than those usually found in the literature (Deck et al., 2013; 
Charness and Viceisza, 2015; Crosetto and Filippin, 2015). We investigate possible reasons. If we 
consider the average choice over the 12 BRET repetitions, the correlation of this variable to the 
indicator of general risk attitude is higher (corr=0.3851, p-value=0.000). The two correlation 
coefficients are significantly different at a 5.14 percent level. However, this result is driven by group 
identity treated subjects: the correlation coefficient increases from 0.2113 (p-value 0.009) to 0.3696 (p-
value 0.000) when considering Choice in part I and the average choice over the 12 BRET repetitions, 
respectively, with a difference that is significant at the 4.36 percent level. The increase in the 
correlation coefficient value is not significant for the control group and the anchoring treatment. Thus, 
our data would suggest that the self-reported risk attitude measurement is affected by having been 
exposed to several BRET repetitions and possibly having converged to a risk attitude which is 
somewhat more in common with that of fellow group members. However, although correlation 
coefficients differ according to the variable considered (Choice in part I vs average choice), especially 
for treated subjects, they do not differ across treatments: we fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal 
correlation matrices for treated, control and anchoring subjects, either when using Choice in part I (p-
value 0.400) or when using the average choice over the 12 repetitions of the BRET (p-value 0.104). 
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all the analysis investigating the emergence of peer effects is carried out by using one 
observation for each group.  
There are 85 groups in our dataset: 18 in the anchoring and painting treatments, 
17 in the control group and 16 in both the random and the chat treatments. 
In part I, the standard deviation of subjects’ choices within the group they 
belong to is 16.67 on average for the control group, slightly higher for the anchoring 
and random treatment and slightly lower for both the painting and the chat treatment. 
However, it is never significantly different across treatment and control groups. In 
part II, the average value of the variable GroupSD is substantially unchanged with 
respect to part I for the control group, while a remarkable reduction of varying size 
can be observed for the four treatment groups. This is suggestive of the emergence of 
peer effects and of a possible role of group identity, which will be analysed in depth 
in the following section, where we report our main results. The F-test for the equality 
of variable means across all groups shows statistically significant differences between 
groups and two-sample tests for the equality of variable means between each 
treatment and the control group show a significant difference for the painting and 
chat treatments. 
 
1.4.2 Group Identity and Peer Effects 
 
In this section, we investigate the existence and the magnitude of peer effects on risk 
behaviour in order to answer our main research question: does the level of group 
identity affect the intensity of peer effects? That is, are people more likely to change 
their behaviour in order to conform with the behaviour of their peers when they feel a 
stronger sense of membership to the assigned social group?25 
                                                          
25 A simple model describing behaviour in our setting assumes that the individual chooses his/her 
optimal action by maximizing an additive utility function, such as = � � − � � , �   where 
the first term is a payoff deriving from the choice of xi and the second term is the loss in utility arising 
from making a different choice from xj, that of other group members, weighted by a function of the 
level of group identity, � . 
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We compare behaviour in each of the three group identity treatments with 
behaviour in the control group and the anchoring treatment with the aim of verifying 
two hypotheses. Our first hypothesis concerns the existence of peer effects: if peer 
effects on risk behaviour exist, the behaviour of treated groups will differ from the 
behaviour of the control group and the anchoring treatment. Our second hypothesis 
concerns the role of group identity: if group identity affects the intensity of peer 
effects, the magnitude of the effect will increase as the level of group identity 
increases (i.e. it will be lower for the random treatment, higher for the painting 
treatment and even higher for the chat treatment).  
We estimate the following linear regression model: 
 
                                      � = + � + � + �                                                    (1) 
 
where  Yg is the standard deviation of the choices of group g in part II, when the 
treatment protocol is introduced; A� is the dummy for the anchoring treatment;  Tg is 
a vector of dummies for the random, chat and painting treatments and  εg is an error 
term.   
The prediction is that, in the absence of peer effects, there should be no reason 
to expect the coefficients of the vector  T� to be significantly different from zero and 
from γ. Moreover, if group identity plays no role in the intensity of peer effects, there 
should be no statistically significant difference between the different group identity 
treatments in the magnitude of the effects.  
In column (1) of Table 3, OLS estimates of the above model are reported.26 
Results show evidence of peer effects on risk behaviour. The standard deviation in 
the choices of groups of individuals in the random treatment is, on average, 4.1 boxes 
lower than the standard deviation in the choices of “fictitious” groups in the control, 
although the effect is not statistically significant (p-value=0.108). Participants in the 
                                                          
26 In all estimates, we cluster observations at the group level. Moreover, results are also the same when 
checking for session random effects. 
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painting treatment have a group standard deviation which is, on average, 8.5 boxes 
lower than the group standard deviation of subjects in the control group, with an 
effect that is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. The reduction in the 
standard deviation of group choices with respect to the control is very similar (7.8) 
for the chat treatment and the effect is again significant at the 1 per cent level. The 
coefficient of the anchoring treatment is negative, but very small and not statistically 
significant. The reduction in the standard deviation experienced by both the painting 
and the chat treatment is significantly larger than the anchoring treatment (F-
stat=10.21 and 6.22, P-value=0.002 and 0.015, respectively). Thus, what we observe 
in our data is a wish to be similar to the assigned peers and not simple anchoring to 
given numbers.  
 
[Table 3 Here] 
 
Moreover, our results show that group identity strengthens peer effects: an F-test for 
the equality of the reduction in the group standard deviation experienced by the 
random and the painting treatments shows a statistically significant positive 
difference: F-stat=3.48, P-value=0.066. A similar test comparing the painting and 
chat treatments shows no statistically significant difference (F-stat=0.08, P-
value=0.775). A possible explanation for this is that the perceived behaviour of other 
group members in this task may either enhance or mitigate (or leave unaffected) the 
feeling of belonging to the group. Thus, the lack of an additional significant effect 
may be due to the average effect being estimated. A deeper analysis of this issue is 
presented in the following section. 
In column (2), we run the same specification as column (1) by using data from 
part I, when all individuals perform the task under the same conditions and no 
treatment protocol is introduced. As expected, the coefficients of the treatment 
dummies are always not significantly different from zero and of a similar size.  
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Whereas Chen and Li (2009) found that pure categorization itself is sufficient 
to create group effects, because a random assignment is as effective as a group 
assignment based on participant painting preferences in shaping social preferences, 
our results show that, the typology of categorization matters when looking at an 
individual's risk behaviour and individuals are more affected by their peers when the 
group assignment is based on painting preferences rather than being random.  
Much as in Chen and Li (2009), the group task does not increase peer effects. In 
the following section, we explore possible explanations for why we do not see a 
treatment effect for the chat treatment and show some circumstances under which the 
group task may contribute to strengthening peer effects. 
Given the small sample size, we check the robustness of our results in the final 
column of Table 3 by estimating a difference-in-differences model, in order to 
extrapolate the effect due to the treatment protocol alone. Coefficients in the table 
represent the difference between ex post (part II) differences in the group standard 
deviation between the control group and each of our four treatments and the 
corresponding ex ante (part I) differences.27 The effects are less precisely estimated, 
but results are consistent with the findings in columns (1) and (2): even when we 
exclude the ex-ante (not statistically significant) differences between the control 
group and our treatments, we find a negative effect of the treatment protocol on the 
standard deviation of group members’ choices (p-values of the coefficients are 0.031, 
0.021 and 0.106 for the random, painting and chat treatments, respectively). When 
comparing our treatments to look at the effect of different matching protocols, we 
find that peer effects are larger when the groups are formed on the basis of a shared 
preference rather than randomly but the difference between the painting and the 
random treatments is no longer statistically significant. As regards the chat treatment, 
much as in column (1), it does not produce a significant increase in the effect. 
Therefore, our difference-in-differences model confirms the existence of peer effects 
                                                          
27  In terms of our difference-in-differences model, �� = + � + � + �� ��� + �( � ∗�� ���) + �( � ∗ �� ���) + ��, the coefficients in the table are the coefficients of the interaction 
terms between each treatment and the dummy for part II (φ and the vector θ). 
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on risk behaviour but shows that group identity does not significantly strengthen peer 
effects.  
It is worth noting that the standard deviation of group choices in the control 
group does not change significantly across the two parts.28 Given that participants in 
the control group are never exposed to feedback on group choices and are only 
randomly assigned to groups for the purposes of analysis, this result makes us 
confident that what we are observing is not spurious convergence towards a particular 
value in the second repetition of the task, but is convergence generated by the 
knowledge of peers’ decisions and the desire to be similar to them. 
 
1.4.3 Feeling of Attachment and Treatment Effects 
 
In this section, we explore a possible explanation for why we do not see an additional 
treatment effect for the chat treatment. We speculate that there is a potential issue 
with regard the inducing of a higher level of group identity by having subjects 
perform a group task before the BRET given that the behaviour of individuals in the 
group task (for example absence of collaboration) may weaken the sense of belonging 
to the group instead of strengthening it. Besides spending more time with their 
assigned group, individuals receive new information about their peers during the 
group task that can either strengthen or weaken their perceived similarity to fellow 
group members. Therefore, depending on personal experience during the group task, 
perceived group identity might be either enhanced or mitigated and the lack of an 
additional significant effect may be due to the average effect being estimated. 
To investigate this issue, we restrict our attention to the chat treatment and to a 
set of group characteristics that capture information about the quality of personal 
experience during the group task which we speculate might relate to perceived group 
identity. On the basis of the considered characteristics, we split groups in the chat 
treatment into those where group identity may have been enhanced by the group task 
                                                          
28 That is δ, the coefficient on dummy Part II in the difference-in-differences model in footnote 26, is 
not significantly different from zero. 
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(ChatX) and those where the realization of the considered characteristics could have 
weakened group identity (Chat), thus estimating the following model:                   � = + ℎ� � + � ℎ� � + �. OLS estimates are shown in Table 4.   
 
[Table 4 Here] 
 
Firstly, we take into consideration a question from the final questionnaire which asks 
subjects to rate, on a scale from 0 to 10, how much they thought communicating with 
their group members helped solve the two extra painting questions in the group 
task.29 We use the answers to this question to estimate, in column (1), peer effects on 
risk behaviour in the chat treatment separately for those groups whose participants 
felt that the level of help received from fellow group members during the online chat 
was higher than the average level, Chat Helpful Group30 , and for the remaining 
groups (coefficient on the variable Chat). Groups whose participants considered their 
group to be more helpful than the average have a group standard deviation which is, 
on average, 12.4 boxes lower than the group standard deviation in the control group, 
an effect which is statistically significant at the 1% level, about 5.2 boxes larger than 
the effect for the remaining groups in the chat treatment and 3.8 boxes significantly 
larger than the effect of the painting treatment (F-stat=5.83, p-value=0.0181). Since 
the group task is likely to have enhanced the level of group identity for these groups 
in the chat treatment, this result confirms our idea that personal experience in the 
group task and additional information on group members gathered when interacting 
more may have both positive or negative effects on perceived group identity that may 
compensate for one another when an average effect is estimated.  
Next, we use another question from the final questionnaire which asks subjects 
to rate, on a scale from 0 to 10, how closely attached they felt to their own group 
                                                          
29 On average, subjects rate the help received from their group at the level of 5.5. 
30 On average 12.5% of the groups in the chat treatment perceive their group to be more helpful than 
the average in the group task. 
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throughout the experiment. This is used to identify groups where at least two 
members rated their attachment to their assigned peers at a higher level than the 
average (3.3), Chat Attached to Group.31 Estimates in column (2) show that the effect 
for these groups is -12.4 boxes, statistically significant at the 1% level. This effect is 
6.1 boxes larger than the effect for the remaining groups in the chat treatment and 
about 3.9 boxes significantly larger than the effect of the painting treatment (F-
stat=3.34, p-value=0.071). 
The time subjects spend chatting and the number of messages they exchange in 
order to reach an agreement on the answers in the group task are two additional 
indicators of the extent to which the group task actually contributes to the 
strengthening of group identity. Indeed, an increase in the time (and number of 
messages) needed to find a common answer to the questions signals a higher diversity 
of opinions among group members and greater difficulty in converging towards a 
common view. At one extreme, members of groups that are not able to find an 
agreement may even find that the group task weakens any sense of group attachment 
they might have. In columns (3) and (4), we estimate peer effects on risk behaviour 
separately for groups that, in order to reach an agreement, needed to chat for a 
number of minutes that is lower (Chat <= Median Minutes for Agreement) or higher 
(Chat) than the median (1.3) and needed to exchange a number of messages that is 
lower (Chat <= Median Number Of Messages for Agreement) or higher (Chat) than 
the median (9), respectively.32 Both estimates show that the magnitude of peer effects 
is higher when the time or the number of messages needed to reach an agreement on 
                                                          
31 On average 25% of the groups in the chat treatment have at least two members who expressed a 
level of attachment above the average. There are no groups where all the three members declared an 
above average level of attachment. 
32 In our sample, only one group out of 16 did not reach an agreement on the name of the artists 
responsible for the two additional paintings shown in the group task. We read the log files of the chat 
process for the remaining 15 groups to compute two indicators of the difficulty in reaching an 
agreement (and, thus, weaker feelings of belonging to the group). On average, subjects need about 1.8 
minutes and 9.6 messages to agree on an answer for the group task. Results also hold true when 
considering the mean instead of the median. In order to compute these indicators, we do not take into 
consideration time and messages that were used for purposes other than to agree on the task answers 
(i.e. greetings and comments). In total, subjects chatted for about 3.1 minutes and exchanged 13.6 
messages on average. 
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the possible answers in the group task is lower than the median, possibly because 
individuals feel more similar to their assigned peers.  
Overall our estimates suggest that the weaker peer effects found for the chat 
treatment are due to the fact that the group task does not always enhance the level of 
group identity. When the level of group identity actually increases across treatments, 
so does the magnitude of peer effects on risk behaviour. It is worth noting that being 
able to investigate further how different individual experiences in the group task 
influence perceived group identity and, in turn, its impact on peer effects comes at the 
price of introducing some endogeneity into our model. Indeed, in such estimates we 
cannot exclude the existence of an omitted variable which correlates with both our 
outcome variable and the perceived (helpfulness, attachment) or actual (time and 
messages to reach an agreement) experience in the group task.  
 
1.4.4 Peers’ Influence Over Time 
 
In this section, we extend our analysis by also looking at data from part III of the 
experimental session, where individuals are in the same group as they were in part II 
and perform the BRET another 10 times. On each of these occasions, they have 
information on the number of boxes that each group member decided to collect in the 
previous repetition of the task.  
In Table 5, we estimate the same specification as in column (1) of Table 333  by 
considering both parts II and III, that is all the repetitions of the task in which 
participants have information on group members’ previous choices (column 1), and 
data from part III only, to check whether peer effects are short lived or longer lasting 
(column 2). There are no anchoring effects in either regression and the coefficients of 
our group identity treatment dummies are significantly different from zero.34 This 
confirms our result that individuals are affected by their peers when taking decisions 
                                                          
33  We obtain similar results when we estimate the difference-in-differences model as in column (3) of 
Table 3. 
34 The magnitude of the effect in the painting treatment is larger than in the random treatment, but the 
difference is not statistically significant. 
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in risky settings and shows that peer influence does not vanish after the first 
interaction.35 
 
[Table 5 Here] 
 
Results remain the same even when we control for the number of the repetition within 
the sequence of 11 (part II + part III) or 10 (part III) repetitions of the task (columns 3 
and 4). In particular, for part III, each repetition of the task further reduces the group 
standard deviation by 0.2 boxes on average with an effect that is significant at the 5 
percent level.36  
 
1.4.5 Relative Risk Behaviour and Change in Individuals’ Decisions 
 
In this section, we want to investigate whether, when making their choices, 
individuals are influenced by their riskiness rank within the three-person group they 
belong to – something that can be easily figured out from the feedback on group 
members’ previous decisions – and whether different rank positions are associated 
with different systematic behaviours. As in our main analysis, we only use data from 
parts I and II in this section.  
On the basis of the choice made in part I, a student can find him/herself 
matched with two peers that are either both riskier or both less risky than him/her or 
                                                          
35 When we replicate the specification in column (1) of Table 4, we find that the effect on perceived 
group identity, produced by personal experience in the group task and additional information on group 
members gathered during greater interacting, attenuates over time and is no longer statistically 
significant.  
36 When, separately for each treatment, we regress our dependent variable GroupSD on a categorical 
variable for the repetition number of the task in part III of the experiment, we find that, on average, the 
group standard deviation of subjects in the random and painting treatments is reduced by 0.3 and 0.4, 
respectively, for each repetition of the task in part III of the experiment, an effect which is significant 
at the 10% level. No significant effect emerges for subjects in the anchoring and chat treatments or in 
the control group. Results are reported in Appendix B, Table A2. 
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with peers that are mixed in terms of riskiness (one riskier and one less risky than 
him/her). 
Figure 3 shows, separately for treatment and control groups, how the number of 
boxes collected in part II differs from the decision in part I for each of the three 
typologies of peers that a student may face. On the one hand, when a student in the 
random, chat or painting treatment is assigned to a group whose members are both 
riskier than him/her, that is s/he is the bottom ranked in terms of the number of boxes 
collected when the BRET task is performed for the first time, s/he tends to 
significantly increase the number of boxes collected in part II. On the other hand, 
being the top ranked member of the group, so having two less risky peers, is related 
to a reduction in the number of boxes collected in the second repetition of the task: on 
average the difference between the second and first choice is negative and is 
statistically significant for the painting treatment. Finally, the change in choice for 
subjects with mixed peers is always not significantly different from zero. For 
completeness, we report data from the control group and anchoring treatment as well. 
For these subjects, the effects are very imprecisely estimated and not significantly 
different from zero. 
 
[Figure 3 Here] 
 
In Table 6, we use individual level data in part II of the experiment to run OLS 
estimates of a linear regression model with the aim of investigating whether different 
rank positions within the group, determined on the basis of the choices made in part I, 
are associated with different systematic behaviours. 
 




In columns (1) to (4), we use the change in choice between the two parts as the 
dependent variable and dummies for the typology of peers that a student may face 
(mixed peers is the reference category) as control variables. Estimates confirm what 
has been shown by the graph: on the one hand, individuals whose peers are both less 
risky decrease their choice in part II by about 3.7 boxes on average compared with 
individuals with mixed peers; on the other hand, individuals whose peers are both 
riskier tend to increase their choice by about 11.6 boxes compared with people who 
have mixed peers.  
When looking at relative risk behaviour for the control group, the anchoring 
treatment and the group identity treatments separately, we find that individuals 
assigned to less risky peers in the random, painting and chat treatment reduce their 
choice significantly by about 5.5 boxes and individuals assigned to riskier peers 
increase their choice significantly by about 12.3 boxes. Similar effects are observed 
in the anchoring treatment although the effect for subjects who have less risky peers 
is very imprecisely estimated. As regards the control group, the coefficients are 
positive regardless of the typology of peers that participants engage with (although 
the effect is not significant for subjects who have less risky peers). This may possibly 
reflect the general trend of reduced risk aversion in the second repetition of the task 
with a larger reduction for very risk averse individuals.  
In column (5) we estimate a difference-in-differences model to compare the 
change in choices driven by different rank positions within the group observed in the 
group identity treatments with that emerging in the control group. Coefficients in the 
table represent the interaction terms between having less risky or riskier peers, 
respectively, and a dummy for being in the group identity treatments instead of in the 
control group. The estimation confirms what explained above, that is there is not a 
statistically significant increase in the risky choice due to being in the group identity 
treatments for subjects having riskier peers but there is a significant decrease in 
choice for subjects in the group identity treatments whose peers are less risky.  
As shown in section 1.4.1, when the BRET is repeated, individuals tend to be 
more risk seeking in the second risk elicitation. Our results suggest that when group 
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identity goes in the same direction of the effect of a second risk elicitation (i.e. when 
peers are riskier than the individual) the already large increase in risk-taking 
behaviour does not amplify. Instead, when group identity works in an opposite 
direction (i.e. when the individual has two less risky peers) the tendency to increase 
risk seeking in the second risk elicitation is more than offset by the desire to converge 
to the less risky peers. 
Using the change in choice between the two parts as the dependent variable 
means assuming persistence in risk behaviour, in other words forcing the coefficient 
on the choice that is made the first time the task is performed to be 1. In column (6), 
we relax this assumption and run a regression which has the number of boxes 
collected in part II as the dependent variable and introduces the number of boxes 
collected in part I among the regressors. This specification, estimated on the 
subsample of individuals in the group identity treatments, allows us to separate peer 
effects on risk behaviour from mean regression effects. The coefficient on Choice 
Part I shows that part of the observed effect is due to regression to the mean: subjects 
who collected one additional box in part I will collect 0.7 additional boxes on average 
in part II. Even when controlling for regression to the mean, peers’ risk behaviour 
plays a role in shaping an individual’s decision in part II if the student has two riskier 
peers: his/her choice in part II increases by about 7 boxes with an effect that is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Subjects with two less risky peers 
decrease their choice on average, but the effect is not significantly different from 
zero. 37  However, when compared with the tendency to decrease risk aversion 
emerging in the control group (column 7), the increases in risk aversion for 
individuals in a group identity treatment whose peers are less risky is statistically 
                                                          
37 Our results remain qualitatively unchanged if, instead of considering a dummy for the individual’s 
rank within the group based on the level of riskiness of peers, we look at how far the top and bottom 
ranked subjects are from either the choice of the middle ranked student or the mean choice of their 
group. Moreover, our results are robust also when we restrict the analysis to the subsample of 
participants belonging to the group identity treatments whose initial risk attitude is at a level for which 
we have at least one subject for each riskiness rank. We find that participants who start from the same 
risk attitude and end up having riskier peers significantly increase their choice in part II by 5.5 boxes. 
A significant role of peers’ risk behaviour for subjects with riskier peers is found also when 
considering the change in choice between the two parts as the dependent variable. 
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significant. Instead, the increase in risk-seeking behaviour due to having riskier peers 
is economically important but is very imprecisely estimated.  
All in all our estimates suggest that subjects tend to adjust their choice on the 
basis of their relative position: individuals whose peers are both riskier/less risky tend 
to increase/decrease their choice in part II when compared with individuals with 
mixed peers. When ruling out the component of the effect caused by regression to the 
mean, peers’ risk behaviour continues to play a significant role for bottom ranked 
individuals while it is very close to zero for top ranked individuals in the subsample 
of individuals in the group identity treatments. However, while for subjects having 
riskier peers the decrease in risk aversion goes in the same direction of the evidence 
of a more risk-seeking behaviour in a second risk elicitation emerging in the literature 
and in our data, the opposite is true for top ranked individuals who experience a 
significant increase in risk aversion when performing the BRET for the second time, 
after being grouped and having had information on the choices made in part I by 
fellow group members. 
 
  
1.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper, we study whether and to what extent group identity affects the 
magnitude of peer effects on an individual’s risk behaviour. We believe our paper is 
the first to provide evidence of how different perceptions of membership to an 
assigned social group can affect the tendency of individuals to change their risk 
behaviour in order to match the prevalent behaviour of their peers. 
We run a laboratory experiment where an individual’s risk behaviour is 
measured by using the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task. Peer effects are introduced by 
giving subjects information on their peers’ previous decisions and different levels of 
group identity are induced by combining two assignment methods (one random and 
one based on painting preferences) and a collective problem solving task that uses an 
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online chat program to enhance the feeling of belonging to the assigned group. The 
presence of anchoring effects is controlled by running a treatment where individuals 
are shown numbers without any reference to a peer group and peers’ choices. 
We find that subjects are affected by their peers’ choices and they change their 
decisions in order to assimilate their behaviour to that of their peers when they have 
information on the choices made by the fellow members of their group. This change 
in behaviour is not driven by anchoring, but represents pure peer effects. Moreover, 
the typology of categorization matters and individuals are significantly more affected 
by their peers when the group assignment, instead of being random, is based on 
painting preferences, that is group identity is intensified because group members are 
more likely to feel similar to each other due to their sharing at least one characteristic 
with their peers. The effect of a less impersonal matching protocol based on shared 
preferences is still positive but no longer statistically significant when a difference-in-
differences model is estimated. Also, we do not observe a significant increase in the 
magnitude of peer effects when the less impersonal preference-based matching 
procedure is combined with a group task. We speculate that this may be due to the 
fact that the group task does not always contribute to the enhancing of group identity 
and find that the magnitude of peer effects increases when the group task strengthens 
the feeling of group belonging because group members feel attached to each other, 
help each other during the online chat and/or the group reaches an agreement on the 
possible answers to the group task very quickly. 
Peer effects are persistent over time while the effect of personal experience 
during the group task on perceived group identity, and in turn on peer effects, is 
weakened with further repetitions of the risk elicitation task. Moreover, we find that 
individuals are influenced by their riskiness rank within the three-person group they 
belong to, which they can easily work out from the feedback on group members’ 
previous decisions. Individuals whose peers are less risky tend to make less risky 
choices, while individuals matched with riskier peers tend to take on more risk. This 
latter effect remains significant for treated participants even when ruling out the 
component of the effect due to regression to the mean. The increase in risk aversion 
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experienced by subjects having less risky peers goes in the opposite direction and 
more than offsets the tendency to decrease risk aversion when performing the risk 
elicitation task for the second time that emerges in the literature. Instead, the increase 
in risk-seeking behaviour due to having riskier peers is similar to the increase in 
riskiness implied by a second risk elicitation. 
Studying the influence peers have on an individual’s risk behaviour may 
provide an important contribution to the optimal design of policy interventions aimed, 
for example, at remediating deficits in educational achievement and improving the 
labour market prospects of the young unemployed. We show that peers influence an 
individual’s risk behaviour in an artificial social environment, i.e. a laboratory 
setting, and that a less impersonal categorization procedure and an increased -
positive- interaction with fellow group members strengthen peer effects. Our results 
may be indicative of the effect peer group behaviour may have on an individual's risk 
behaviour in the real world too. This would imply that targeting the risk behaviour of 
a few individuals may have an effect on outcomes which have been found strongly 
influenced by risk, not only for the target pool of subjects, but also for their peers. 
Moreover, given that the magnitude of peer effects increases as the closeness to the 
group increases, choosing the target pool wisely may amplify the benefits of the 
policy intervention.  
Our result that more interaction among peers is, in itself, not sufficient to 
enhance the salience of group identity makes the investigation of the dynamics of 
peer interaction and of the influence of new information on group members 
interesting. Moreover, our experiment focuses on risk behaviour by referring to 
monetary decisions in the gain domain. Risk matters across a whole range of other 
domains, too (i.e. monetary-loss domain, health, leisure and sport, occupation, etc.). 
Hence, studying the role of group identity and peer effects on a person’s decision 










Randomization Checks  
 
In the first five columns in Table A1, the means for a number of individual 
characteristics are reported in treatment and control groups separately. In the last two 
columns, we report the F-stat and the p-value of a test for the equality of variable 
means across all groups. 
 









Peer Influence in Part III: Effect of Repetition Number  
 
In Table A2, we regress our dependent variable GroupSD, separately for each 
treatment, on a categorical variable for the repetition number of the task in part III of 
the experiment. We find that, on average, the group standard deviation of subjects in 
the random and painting treatments diminishes by about 0.3 and 0.4, respectively, for 
each repetition of the task in part III of the experiment, with an effect that is 
significant at the 10% level. No significant effect emerges for subjects in the 
anchoring and chat treatments or in the control group. 
 










Figure 2: Computer screen for a participant who chose to collect 35 
boxes 
 























Table 1. Treatments of the experiment 
 
 Group assignment 


























Control NO NO NO  NO NO NO - 3 51 
Anchoring NO NO NO  NO YES YES INDIRECT 3 54 
Random YES NO NO  NO YES YES DIRECT 3 48 
Painting NO YES NO  NO YES YES DIRECT 3 54 




Table 2. Descriptive statistics and treatment comparisons 
 
 





















Choice           
Part I 40.784 43.167 -0.600 38.396 0.614 43.611 -0.807 41.604 -0.232 0.60 
 (18.590) (22.231) (0.552) (20.007) (0.540) (17.243) (0.422) (16.567) (0.817) (0.661) 
Part II 46.275 41.185 1.361 42.542 0.999 46.167 0.033 42.542 1.127 1.00 
 (19.284) (19.022) (0.177) (17.881) (0.320) (13.566) (0.974) (13.286) (0.263) (0.407) 
Obs. 51 54  48  54  48   
GroupSD        
Part I 16.670 18.117 -0.509 18.716 -0.827 15.286 0.692 14.272 1.037 0.97 
 (5.800) (10.222) (0.615) (7.889) (0.415) (5.791) (0.494) (7.091) (0.308) (0.429) 
Part II 17.596 16.853 0.284 13.459 1.623 9.065 3.764 9.784 2.901 4.74 
 (7.040) (8.136) (0.778) (7.278) (0.115) (6.033) (0.001) (8.035) (0.007) (0.002) 
Obs. 17 18  16  18  16   
The second column in each treatment reports t statistic and p-value of two-sample t tests for the 
equality of means between the corresponding treatment and the control group. The last column reports 






Table 3. Group identity and peer effects. OLS estimates  
 
Group Standard Deviation 
 Part II Part I Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Anchoring -0.7433 1.4477 -2.1910  
 (2.6215) (2.8487) (3.7205)    
Random -4.1368 2.0464 -6.1832**  
 (2.5459) (2.4715) (2.8217)    
Painting -8.5312*** -1.3836 -7.1476**  
 (2.2684) (2.0010) (3.0361)    
Chat -7.8124*** -2.3978 -5.4146    
 (2.6899) (2.3088) (3.3113)    
Observations 85 85 170 
Adj R-squared 0.151 -0.001 0.111 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 




Table 4. Feelings of attachment and treatment effects. OLS estimates  
 
Group Standard Deviation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Chat -7.1606** -6.2873* -4.4881 -4.1849 
 (2.9233) (3.1233) (3.6472) (4.1434) 
Chat Helpful Group -12.3752***    
 (1.8850)    
Chat Attached to Group  -12.3878***   
  (2.3486)   
Chat <= Median Minutes for Agreement   -9.8128***  
   (3.1668)  
Chat <= Median Number Of Messages for Agreement     -9.4233*** 
    (2.9313) 
Observations 33 33 32 32 
Adj R-squared 0.184 0.213 0.189 0.186 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5.  Peer effects in further repetitions of the task. OLS estimates  
  
Group Standard Deviation 








Anchoring -1.6957 -1.7910 -1.6957 -1.7910 
 (1.8945) (1.9242) (1.8955) (1.9253) 
Random -5.9115*** -6.0889*** -5.9115*** -6.0889*** 
 (1.9670) (2.0176) (1.9681) (2.0188) 
Painting -7.2910*** -7.1669*** -7.2910*** -7.1669*** 
 (1.7612) (1.8145) (1.7622) (1.8155) 
Chat -6.8399*** -6.7427*** -6.8399*** -6.7427*** 
 (1.9748) (1.9891) (1.9758) (1.9902) 
Repetition number   -0.1229 -0.2471** 
   (0.0855) (0.0975) 
Observations 935 850 935 850 
Adj R-squared 0.114 0.109 0.115 0.115 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 




Table 6.  Rank position in part I and number of collected boxes 
 Choice Part II-Choice Part I Choice Part II 
 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Less Risky Peers -3.6556* 4.3529 -5.0667 -5.5336*** -9.8866** -1.0027 -18.963*** 
 (1.9401) (4.6598) (5.6511) (1.9787) (4.9364) (1.9885) (5.5297) 
Riskier Peers 11.6264*** 12.8235** 9.1754** 12.2818*** -0.5418 6.9330*** 8.9020 
 (1.9212) (5.5615) (3.6232) (2.3836) (5.9006) (2.1448) (6.8862) 
Choice Part I      0.6685*** 0.5447** 
      (0.0722) (0.2160) 
Observations 255 51 54 150 201 150 201 
Adj. R-squared 0.143 0.031 0.053 0.278 0.183 0.439 0.380 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 




Table A1.  Participants’ characteristics across treatment groups 
 Means F-stat 
 
p-value 
 Control Anchoring Random Painting Chat 
Choice 40.784 43.167 38.396 43.611 41.604 0.603 0.661 
Female 0.647 0.648 0.646 0.630 0.75 0.511 0.728 
Age 22.647 22.241 22.688 22.685 22 0.184 0.946 
Asian 0.333 0.333 0.417 0.296 0.271 0.663 0.618 
European 0.588 0.611 0.5 0.593 0.604 0.405 0.805 
Economics 0.196 0.278 0.208 0.241 0.167 0.542 0.705 
HSS  0.627 0.556 0.563 0.556 0.625 0.290 0.884 
MVM 0.078 0.000 0.042 0.093 0.104 1.611 0.172 
Distinction 0.235 0.315 0.271 0.407 0.271 1.099 0.357 
Good 0.627 0.519 0.479 0.444 0.521 0.973 0.423 
Mother Uni Degree 0.529 0.500 0.646 0.519 0.625 0.900 0.465 
Father Uni Degree 0.667 0.556 0.75 0.648 0.646 1.072 0.371 
Brothers 0.824 0.741 0.625 0.852 0.667 0.604 0.660 
Sisters 0.725 0.759 0.729 0.611 0.563 0.585 0.674 
Self-Reported Risk 5.333 5.481 5.125 5.537 5.521 0.307 0.873 
Smoker 0.137 0.111 0.063 0.093 0.125 0.441 0.779 
Drinker 0.922 0.889 0.875 0.870 0.938 0.470 0.758 
Study Alone 0.863 0.926 0.896 0.926 0.813 1.148 0.334 
Observations 51 54 48 54 48   
Notes: In the last two columns, we report the F-stat and p-value of a test for the equality of variable 
means across all groups. HSS is the Humanities and Social Sciences degree. MVM is the Medicine 




Table A2.  Effect of repetition number in part III. OLS estimates 
 Group Standard Deviation 
 Control Anchoring Random Painting Chat 
Repetition Number -0.2461 -0.3613 -0.3469* -0.4037* 0.1564 
 (0.2364) (0.2535) (0.1963) (0.1948) (0.1905) 
Observations 170 180 160 180 160 
Adj R.squared 0.001 0.007 0.011 0.020 -0.003 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 










Incentive Schemes and Peer Effects on Risk 




This paper studies whether incentivizing performance with competition and cooperation-
based incentive schemes, rather than individual compensation, affects peer effects on 
subsequent risk behaviour. We run a laboratory experiment in which we introduce three 
different compensation schemes - piece-rate, the equal-split-sharing-rule and a tournament - 
associated with a real effort task. Risk behaviour is measured by using the Bomb Risk 
Elicitation Task. We find that competition more than halves peer influence on risk behaviour 
compared with piece-rate compensation, but treatment effects are not statistically significant. 
Competition also significantly reduces an individual’s feeling of attachment to their peers 
and self-reported peer influence. Finally, we find that relative performance in the 
incentivized task affects the extent of peer effects on subsequent risk behaviour: the worst 
performing subjects within the group are influenced by their peers, while the best performing 






Keywords: Risk Behaviour, Incentive Schemes, Peer Effects, Competition, Equal-split-
sharing-rule  
 




2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Risk is inherent in a wide range of economic decisions, such as the choice of pathway 
taken in secondary school, the field of study chosen at university, job decisions, 
health-related behaviours, marriage, parenthood, migration and, of course, the 
allocation of financial assets (Saks and Shore, 2005; Belzil and Leonardi, 2007; 
Schmidt, 2008; Caner and Okten, 2010; Jaeger et al., 2010; Light and Ahn, 2010; 
Spivey, 2010; De Paola and Gioia, 2012). Recent research has shown that individual 
risk attitudes are not immutable personality traits, but are shaped at least partly by the 
environment, such as family structure or the gender composition of the classroom 
(Dohmen et al, 2012; Booth and Nolen, 2012), by emotional states (Bassi et al., 2013; 
Conte et al., 2013; Campos-Vazquez and Cuilty; 2014), by life experiences such as 
poverty, job loss or violence (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; Hetschko and Preuss, 2015; 
Callen et al., 2014) and, more directly relevant to this paper, an individual’s risk 
attitudes appear to be shaped by their peers (Cooper and Rege, 2011; Lahno and 
Serra-Garcia, 2015).  
Peer effects are particularly valuable from a policy perspective because they 
amplify the benefits of any policy intervention thanks to the social multiplier effect 
(Mansky, 1993). We do however know little about what determines the existence and 
strength of peer effects. Peers are, by definition, part of the same social setting, but 
the nature of their social interactions may differ. At school or at work, peers may be 
competing to be the best or to be promoted. However, they may also have incentives 
to cooperate, in order to share specific knowledge or carry out complex projects. 
Competitive and cooperative incentive schemes are widely used by educational 
institutions, organizations and private companies to increase individual performance. 
In this paper, we investigate the extent to which the nature of incentive schemes to 
which individuals are exposed affects the existence and strength of peer effects. In a 
nutshell, we ask: are you more likely to be influenced by your peers if you compete 
with them or if you have to cooperate? Since peer interactions outlast the 
competitive/cooperative task, we are not interested in peer effects on immediate 
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productivity, but instead study peer effects on subsequent risk behaviour and, in turn, 
on subsequent decisions influenced by risk attitudes, which could affect future 
productivity.  
We hypothesize that the introduction of a competition/cooperation-based 
incentive scheme is similar to the manipulation of group identity38, meaning that it 
may influence peer effects on risk behaviour: compared with working individually 
but surrounded by random co-workers, subjects may be less likely to perceive a 
competitor as a member of their group because when peers are competitors, they are 
working to reach a personal goal that only one peer will be able to meet. Instead, 
being teammates may (depending on the teammates’ behaviour) increase peer 
salience and enhance the feeling of belonging to the peer group. In fact, with 
cooperation-based incentive schemes, like an equal-split-sharing-rule, peers work to 
reach a common goal, which enhances their feelings of group membership. However, 
since a peer’s performance/contribution to the group’s output has a positive effect on 
the individual, peer relationships may also be weakened if a peer’s contribution does 
not meet individual expectations, for example, if they do not make enough effort due 
to free-riding. The first chapter has shown that group identity affects peer effects: 
higher levels of group identity significantly increase peer effects on risk behaviour; 
that is, individuals with a stronger feeling of group membership, and a greater sense 
of belonging to the social group, are significantly more influenced by the risk 
behaviour of their peers when taking decisions involving risk.  
Our hypothesis is inspired by recent empirical research in organizational 
psychology and management, which shows that incentive schemes affect 
relationships between colleagues and this, in turn, has an impact on job satisfaction, 
commitment to an organization and turnover (Ducharme and Martin, 2000; Morrison, 
2004; Morgeson and Humphrey, 2006; Quigley et al., 2007; Chiaburu and Harrison, 
2008; Barnes et al., 2011; Taylor and Westover, 2011; Skaalvik and Skaalvik, 2011; 
Onemu, 2014). Our research is also motivated by recent evidence in the literature on 
                                                          
38 Group identity is defined by psychologists as “the portion of an individual’s self-concept derived 
from the sense of belonging to the social group” (Hogg and Vaughan, 2002). 
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peer effects, which suggests that not all peers matter and some matter more than 
others (Vaquera and Kao, 2008; Lomi et al., 2011; Lin and Weinberg, 2014; Borjas 
and Doran, 2015). We add to this literature by considering the long-lasting nature of 
peer relationships, thus focusing on the influence of teammates and competitors on 
risk behaviour – and decisions involving risk – following the incentivized work, and 
not just on how peers affect immediate performance.  
We answer our research question by conducting a laboratory experiment with 
three treatment conditions corresponding to three different compensation schemes - 
piece-rate (PR), the equal-split-sharing-rule (ESSR) and a tournament (TO). Each of 
these schemes is associated with an effort task, named the Coin Task, which consists 
of five minutes spent recognizing the value and country of origin of a random 
sequence Euro coins, displayed on a computer screen. Risk preferences are measured 
both before and after the incentivized task by using the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task 
(Crosetto and Filippin, 2013), a simple elicitation method in which participants must 
choose how many boxes to collect out of 100. 99 of the boxes contain £0.10, while 
one contains a bomb that destroys all the participants’ earnings. At the end of the 
experiment, subjects complete a short questionnaire including a question on their 
attachment to peers and a question on perceived peer influence.  
We find that participants in the PR treatment group are influenced by their 
randomly assigned peer when making their risky choice following the effort task: for 
each additional box collected in the first performance by their randomly assigned 
peer, they increase their choice in the second performance of the BRET by about 0.20 
boxes, an effect significant at the 5% level. Peer effects are very similar in size to the 
former scheme for participants in the ESSR treatment group (+0.17 boxes chosen for 
a unitary increase in their teammate’s previous choice, significant at the 5% level), 
while they are more than halved when performance is incentivized by competition 
(+0.06 boxes, not statistically significant). Thus, our findings confirm the evidence of 
peer effects on risk behaviour which has emerged from the economic literature and 
seem to point to a role of incentivizing schemes on peer influence, particularly for 
tournaments as these produce an economically significant attenuation of peer 
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influence. This effect is not statistically significant using OLS estimates, but becomes 
so when using WLS estimates, as the latter take into account heteroscedasticity.  
In a setting of complete information, where individuals can observe both their 
peers’ behaviour before the incentivized task and the outcome of this task (which 
commonly occurs), incentives may heterogeneously shape subsequent peer influence 
because, after the incentivized task, peers are no longer under equal conditions (for 
example, after a competition there are winners and losers). Therefore, the extent to 
which individuals are influenced by their peers may depend on these conditions. In 
fact, the literature on feedback, which typically focuses on its effects on performance, 
considers different behaviours depending on ranking (i.e., underdogs vs frontrunners) 
(Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval, 2009; Kuhnen and Tymula, 2012). Likewise, the 
literature on emotions associates different emotions with positive and negative 
feedback (Kräkel, 2008; Belschak and Hartog, 2009). We investigate whether peer 
effects differ depending on relative performance in the incentivized effort task, 
finding that peer influence on risk behaviour is mostly driven by participants with the 
lowest scores (+0.38, significant at the 1% level in PR), while peer effects are 
significantly smaller and no longer statistically significant for subjects who obtain the 
highest scores (+0.10, p-value=0.438 in PR). This evidence comes mainly from peer 
groups that are very heterogeneous in terms of their performance in the effort task. 
Differences in peer influence across treatments are never statistically significant. 
However, they are close to zero for the highest scoring subjects, but become larger 
for the lowest scoring subjects: the influence of a better performing teammate is 
about one third higher than that of a better randomly assigned person, while the 
influence of a winner is roughly halved compared with the latter.  
Since our hypothesis that incentives affect peer influence was based on the idea 
that the implementation of incentive schemes may change feelings of group 
membership, we use the answers to the question in the final questionnaire on 
attachment to peers to check this assertion. We find that after competing, participants 
feel significantly less attached to their peer than after the implementation of either a 
piece-rate compensation scheme (-1.15 on a 0 to 10 scale) or a cooperation-based 
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incentive scheme (-1.72). Moreover, tournaments significantly attenuate the 
probability of self-reported peer influence compared with the other two compensation 
schemes (-17 percentage points vs PR and -27 percentage points vs ESSR).  
Our findings have implications for the design and evaluation of optimal 
compensation schemes. For instance, suppose that we have to structure the 
environment in compulsory education. Since we care about individual performance, 
as we think that it reflects the accumulation of skills or knowledge which will 
improve human capital and have some value in the labour market, we might want to 
choose an incentive scheme that produces the highest increase in performance, and 
evaluate it only on the basis of the performance boost achieved. However, suppose 
that we also publicly finance higher education. If individuals face some risk in their 
chances of successfully finishing higher education, we might worry about people 
being less risk-averse in making their decisions. Therefore, the incentives 
implemented in compulsory education become important, as they may affect peer 
relationships and influence which, in turn, has an effect on individual decisions and 
the payoffs to society from financing higher education. Likewise, in research and 
development, individuals care about the results of their current projects, but risk 
attitudes will shape the types of future projects that are attempted.   
The paper is structured into five parts. Section 2.2 briefly presents the related 
literature. In section 2.3, we describe our experimental design. Section 2.4 presents 
our empirical analysis. Section 2.5 concludes. 
   
 
2.2 RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Studying the impact of different compensation schemes on peer effects on risk 
behaviour makes three contributions to the existing economics literature. First, it 
offers new evidence on peer effects on risk behaviour. As a consequence, it sheds 
more light onto the extent to which the characteristics of the environment can shape 
risk attitudes, which are often considered to be innate behavioural traits. Last but not 
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least, it improves our understanding of the consequences of implementing incentive 
schemes which, especially in a long-run perspective with repeated and continuous 
interaction, may exert effects beyond a change in immediate performance.  
In the first chapter, we have studied the role of group identity on peer effects on 
risk behaviour. We use the same risk elicitation task and the same design to provide 
feedback on peers’ ex-ante risk behaviour but, instead of manipulating group identity 
between the ex-ante and ex-post risk elicitation, we manipulate the incentive structure 
associated with a real effort task.39  
Our hypothesis, i.e., that collaborators and competitors represent different types 
of peers and that the implementation of such incentive schemes may therefore trigger 
different levels of attachment to the peer group and induce peer effects of different 
magnitudes, deepens our understanding of recent evidence in the peer effects 
literature. This evidence suggests that not all peers matter and some matter more than 
others. For example, Borjas and Doran (2015) use very nice data on the emigration of 
Soviet mathematicians after the collapse of the Soviet Union to study how changes in 
the composition of peer groups (i.e., losing a competitor - researcher working on the 
same topic -, a co-worker - researcher employed by the same department -, or a 
collaborator - co-author -) changes the productivity of the remaining mathematicians. 
They find that the productivity of the mathematicians who lose competitors increases, 
while researchers who lose their co-workers and collaborators, especially those of 
high-quality, lose the positive knowledge spillover associated with these peers. 
Similarly, Chan, Li and Pierce (2014) examine data from a department store in which 
multiple brands establish their own counters to compete on a common retail floor; 
each firm may use either team-based (TC) or individual-based (IC) compensation 
schemes for its salespeople. The authors find that TC incentives improve team 
                                                          
39 In addition, we have pairs instead of groups of three, because we also want to study the role played 
by the outcome of the incentivized task. Having pairs allows us to compare subjects who obtain 
different outcomes across treatments. In fact, within the pairs there is a winner and a loser in the 
competition-based scheme, and a best and worst performing subject in the piece-rate and teamwork 
schemes (ties are not a major issue, because subjects receive feedback on their performance, and in 
such a case the winner is randomly chosen). With groups of three, there are instead a winner and two 
losers in the competition, but in the other two treatments there is a three-level ranking, with the middle 
ranked individual not necessarily being considered as the bottom ranked individual.    
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performance by stimulating positive peer effects. On the other hand, IC incentives 
stimulate competition between salespeople working for the same firm. Heterogeneity 
in the ability of salespeople also improves team performance at TC counters, while at 
IC counters worker heterogeneity reduces overall sales. We go one step further by 
looking at peer influence not only on productivity, but on subsequent risk behaviour 
and, in turn, on subsequent decisions involving risk which could affect future 
productivity.  
We therefore contribute to the recent literature showing that risk behaviour is 
not an immutable personality trait, but is influenced by characteristics of the 
environment, emotional states and peer behaviour. Dohmen et al. (2012) show 
evidence of the role played by family size and birth order on the intergenerational 
transmission of risk attitudes, with firstborn children and children with fewer siblings 
being more strongly influenced by their parents. Booth and Nolen (2012), in a field 
study, show instead that women’s risk preferences are influenced by the classroom’s 
gender composition. Haushofer and Fehr (2014) point to a positive relationship 
between the psychological consequences of poverty, such as stress and negative 
affective states, and risk-averse decision-making. A positive relationship with risk 
aversion has also been highlighted for job loss, exposure to violence and emotional 
states like sadness (Callen et al., 2014; Campos-Vazquez and Cuilty, 2014; Hetschko 
and Preuss, 2015). Finally, several papers (see, among the others, Gardner and 
Steinberg, 2005; Cooper and Rege, 2011; Ahern, Duchin and Shumway, 2013; 
Bougheas, Nieboer and Sefton, 2013; Balsa, Gandelman and Gonzàles, 2015; Lahno 
and Serra-Garcia, 2015) show evidence of the role played by peers in an individual's 
risk behaviour.  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to suggest the implementation of 
incentive schemes as a possible mechanism for shaping an individual’s risk behaviour 
through a change in peer influence. Most of the literature on incentive schemes has 
focused on their impact on individual performance.40 However, the consequences of 
                                                          
40 See among others Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini, 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Ivanova-
Stenzel and Kübler, 2005; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Antonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh, 2009; 
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implementing incentive schemes are not limited to productivity alone, as it has also 
been shown that they affect colleague relations. This in turn has an impact on job 
satisfaction, commitment to an organization and turnover (Ducharme and Martin, 
2000; Morrison, 2004; Morgeson and Humphrey, 2006; Chiaburu and Harrison, 
2008; Barnes et al., 2011; Taylor and Westover, 2011; Skaalvik and Skaalvik, 2011; 
Onemu, 2014). For example, Anderson et al. (2007) highlight the deformation of 
relationships and a decline in the free and open sharing of information and knowledge 
as being among the negative consequences of competition between scientists. 
Quigley et al. (2007) study knowledge sharing and performance, suggesting a 
positive role played by incentives that emphasize group performance and that are 
strongly reinforced through more positive norms for knowledge sharing.  
We contribute to this literature by investigating how the change in colleague 
relations after an incentivized task affects peer influence on subsequent decisions. 
There is some literature which focuses on the role played by peers in 
cooperative/competitive settings, but it mainly focuses on the (heterogeneous) effect 
of peers on individual performance in the task to be accomplished under a 
cooperative/competitive compensation scheme (Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini, 
2003; Ivanova-Stenzel and Kübler, 2005; Antonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh, 2009; 
Lavy, 2012; Datta Gupta, Poulsen and Villeval, 2013). As we said above, we go 
beyond the widely studied “incentive schemes – performance” relationship, because 
in real life peer relationships outlast an incentivized task and so the effects of the 
incentives may spread to other decisions and behaviours, which may have important 





                                                                                                                                                                     
Paserman, 2010; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Lavy, 2012; Bandiera et al., 
2013; Datta Gupta, Poulsen and Villeval, 2013. 
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In order to exogenously sort subjects into treatment groups exposed to different 
incentives, we manipulate the compensation scheme associated with a real effort task 
called the Coin Task, which consists of recognizing the value and country of origin of 
randomly selected Euro coins. A similar task has been used by Belot and Schröder 
(2013, 2016) to study counterproductive behaviour and monitoring. 
When performing the Coin Task, participants see on the left-hand side of their 
computer screen a table with different Euro coins; for each coin, the indication of the 
value and country is shown (see Figure 1). A Euro coin randomly drawn from the 
table appears on the right hand side of the screen. They have to select the value and 
country of the Euro coin from two lists, one with all the countries that use the Euro as 
their domestic currency, and the other with all of the values that Euro coins may take. 
After confirming their choice, a new table and a new coin to identify appear on the 
computer screen.  
 
[Figure 1 Here] 
 
Participants have five minutes to recognize as many coins as they can. Their score in 
the Coin Task is the number of coins that they are able to successfully recognize 
within this five-minute time period. There is no penalty for wrong answers. Before 
they start, participants are allowed to practice the task for one minute. The number of 
coins correctly identified during this practice period does not affect their earnings.  
The use of real effort tasks to manipulate incentives is commonplace in the 
literature on competition, cooperation and their impact on performance. We choose to 
influence the competitive/cooperative nature of the environment using this new task 
because it is simple and the outcome is easy to measure. More importantly, compared 
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with the widely used task of adding sets of two-digit numbers (Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2007), there is no gender stereotype associated with the identification of 
coins. Furthermore, answering correctly does not require any knowledge or ability, as 
subjects may in principle get all of the answers correct, provided that they exert a 
sufficient level of effort. This does not, of course, mean that ability or knowledge do 
not help, as people who are very good may be faster at the task and their effort cost 
may be lower; however, no specific knowledge is required to answer correctly. 
Finally, it does not involve learning and can be performed with real money and 
outside of the lab for field studies, as in the study of Belot and Schröder (2013, 2016). 
Individual levels of risk aversion are measured using the Bomb Risk Elicitation 
Task – BRET (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013).41 When playing the BRET, subjects see 
on their PC screen a square formed by 10x10 cells, which represent the 100 boxes 
that they can collect (see Figure 2a). They have to choose how many boxes to collect 
and write their chosen number.42 They can therefore choose their preferred lottery 
among 100 lotteries, whose outcomes and probabilities are fully described only by 
one parameter, i.e., the number of collected boxes.  
Earnings increase linearly with the number of boxes collected, but participants 
are warned that their earnings are provisional. In fact, they know that one box 
contains a bomb without knowing in which box the bomb is located. The position of 
the bomb is randomly determined for each participant at the end of each performance 
of the task, but it is not revealed. 
The boxes are collected in numerical order starting from box one in the top left-
hand corner and continuing until the number of boxes chosen by the subject is 
reached. While reading the instructions, we displayed a dynamic visual representation 
of the game on the participants’ computer screens to show the order of collection. 
 
                                                          
41 In both economics and psychology, there are a variety of experimental methods for eliciting and 
assessing risk behaviour. See Charness, Gneezy and Imas (2013) for a review of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the most common risk elicitation methods. 
42 We asked participants to write the same number twice and to confirm their choice in order to avoid 
measurement errors due to an incorrect number being input. 
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[Figure 2 Here] 
 
If a participant collects the bomb, s/he earns zero. If s/he collects a number of boxes 
lower than the number of the box containing the bomb (i.e., s/he does not collect the 
bomb) s/he obtains £0.10 for each collected box. After confirming their decision, 
participants see on their screen the square of boxes showing the collected boxes in 
light grey and a message displaying their potential earnings in both situations (if the 
bomb is collected or not). Figure 2b shows the computer screen for a participant who 
chose to collect 35 boxes.43  
Participants are allowed to play a practice round before the beginning of the 
experiment. This practice round gives them the opportunity to make sure that they 
understand the rules, the types of decisions they will make and how these will affect 
their earnings. The trial period, however, does not end with the draw of the bomb’s 
position, so as to avoid providing subjects with a reference point regarding the 
bomb’s position.  
We chose to elicit risk attitudes using the BRET because of a number of 
appealing features. It is very easy to understand, thanks to the visual representation of 
the game which intuitively and transparently illustrates its probabilities and 
outcomes44, and its duration is very short. Moreover, compared with other well-
known tasks in the literature, the BRET allows both risk aversion and risk seeking to 
be precisely measured, is defined entirely in the gain domain and does not provide 
                                                          
43 As explained in the first chapter, we decided in favour of a static version of the BRET to prevent the 
individual levels of impatience from affecting participants’ decisions, and thus our indicator of risk 
behaviour. At the same time, we make sure that the participants’ decisions were not driven by 
confusion or an imperfect comprehension of outcomes and probabilities, by further introducing a 
dynamic visual representation of the collection process when explaining the rules of the task, along 
with a visual representation of the boxes collected and not collected after each decision. 
44 Simple methods are most useful in studies such as ours trying to capture the effects of different 
treatments and differences in individual risk preferences (Charness, Gneezy and Imas, 2013). 
Moreover, the absence of complexity in the task should reduce the extent to which social learning 
drives peer effects on individual risk behaviour. 
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any endogenous reference point, thus avoiding the presence of loss aversion as a 




Our design entails three treatment conditions which correspond to three different 
compensation schemes: PR (Piece Rate), ESSR (Equal-Split-Sharing-Rule) and TO 
(Tournament).  
Table 1 describes the main features of our treatments. We have 54 participants, 
corresponding to 27 groups, in the PR and TO treatments and 52 participants, 
corresponding to 26 groups, in the ESSR treatment. 
 
[Table 1 Here] 
 
In the PR treatment group, participants receive £0.20 per correctly identified coin.  
In the ESSR treatment group, the subject’s earnings depend both on his own 
performance and on the performance of a randomly selected participant. The two 
form a team that shares the money earned equally between them. The output of the 
team is achieved by the sum of the number of correct answers of the two members, 
and each teammate earns £0.10 for each correct answer for the team. 
In the TO treatment group, the subject’s earnings depend on his performance 
relative to the performance of a participant randomly selected to be his competitor. 
Within each group composed of two participants, the subject with the highest score 
receives £0.40 for each correct answer, while his competitor receives £0. In the case 
of a tie between group members, the winner is randomly selected and the other 
subject receives nothing. The tournament’s pay scheme is designed so that, for a 
                                                          
45 Moreover, compared with other risk elicitation methods, such as the Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
(Lejuez et al., 2002), in the BRET there is no truncation of the data. 
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given performance, a subject with a 50% chance of winning the tournament receives 
the same expected payoff from the tournament as from the piece-rate scheme. 
We test our hypothesis in a setting of complete information, where subjects 
working under any treatment condition can observe their own output as well as the 
output of the other subject, even if it is irrelevant for their own payoff. In order to 
make the design less artificial for the PR treatment group in terms of viewing 
additional “useless” information, thus attenuating any potential experimenter demand 
effect, all subjects are informed before reading the instructions for the Coin Task and 
being given a detailed explanation of how the earnings of the task are computed that, 
at the end of the task, they will see their earnings, their own score as well as the score 
of a randomly drawn participant in the session. They are told that, although the score 
of the other person may or may not affect their earnings, they will still see it. Thus, at 
the end of the task, subjects in the PR treatment group (which serves as a control 
group) are informed of their earnings, the number of coins they have personally 
identified correctly, as well as the score of a randomly selected participant. ESSR and 
TO subjects are informed of their earnings, their own score and the score of their 
teammate or competitor, respectively. 
To increase the saliency of the cooperative/competitive nature of peer 
interaction, both in the instructions and in the on screen information we refer to the 
peer as “teammate” or “competitor” in the TE and TO treatment groups, respectively, 
while s/he is called “other person” in the PR treatment group.  
 
2.3.3 Experimental Procedure 
 
We conducted the experiment in October 2015 at the Behavioural Laboratory at the 
University of Edinburgh (BLUE), using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).46 160 students 
were recruited using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2015). A total of 9 sessions were 
                                                          
46 The experiment is part of a bigger experiment that includes also two tasks on social preferences 
performed in part III. Here we describe only the parts of the experiment relevant for the analysis.  
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organized, each lasting about 45 minutes, and each student participated in a single 
session only.  
The experiment is divided into two parts (Part I and Part II), as shown in Table 
2. 
 
[Table 2 Here] 
 
In Part I, we elicit risk behaviour. 
In Part II, subjects are randomly matched in pairs. Then, they perform the Euro 
coin recognition task with the assigned incentive scheme and receive feedback on 
their individual potential earnings and the score of both group members. Finally, they 
once again perform the risk behaviour elicitation task as in Part I, but this time, they 
have information about the choices made by the other group member in the previous 
performance of the same task. The instructions make it clear to subjects that their 
payoffs depend solely on their own choice, not on the choice of their partner. The 
information about the choice made previously by the group members is reported both 
on the waiting screen before the main screen of the BRET and in the top right corner 
of the main screen of the BRET. 
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were assigned randomly to a 
computer. Then, we read aloud the instructions for the experiment, which were also 
displayed on the participants’ computer screens. We gave detailed instructions at the 
beginning of each part and, when needed, before each relevant step in the experiment. 
Every time, after reading the instructions, we gave individuals some time to ask 
clarifying questions.  
At the end of the experiment, the participants completed a short questionnaire. 
Then, the task selected for payment and their earnings were shown on the computer 
screen. By only paying for one task, we reduce the chance that decisions in a given 
task may be used to hedge against outcomes in other tasks. Subjects received a show-
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up fee of £3. We paid out their total earnings (including the show-up fee) in cash at 
the end of the experiment. We called participants individually, based on the number 
of their computer; they went into another room, signed a receipt and received their 




2.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of our main variables, both at the aggregate 
level and by treatment group. Variables are divided into three groups: outcomes of 
the Coin Task, risk behaviour measured by choices in the BRET and individual 
predetermined characteristics. In the first four columns, the means of the variables are 
reported. In the last two columns, we report the F-stat and the p-value of a test for the 
equality of variable means across all groups. 
We first present the variables relating to the Coin Task. During the five minutes 
that the effort task lasts, participants try to identify on average about 28 coins. The 
average number of attempts is virtually invariant across treatments, but it ranges from 
9 to 45 in the PR scheme and from 15 to 45 and 18 to 40 in the ESSR and TO 
schemes, respectively. Similarly, on average, PR participants correctly identify about 
25 coins (value ranging from 1 to 43) while ESSR and TO participants have on 
average 25.8 correctly identified coins (values ranging from 13 to 38 and 16 to 38, 
respectively). The identification of about 2 coins is incorrect.47 The variable Highest 
Scoring Within Pair indicates the winners of the competition in TO, the best 
performing partner in PR and the partner who has contributed more to the payoff of 
the team in ESSR. Overall, about 51% of the participants can be classified as best 
                                                          
47 The variable Euro Zone shows that almost 90% of our sample comes from a country that does not 
use the Euro as its currency. Differences in the distribution of people familiar with Euro coins are not 
significant across treatments.  
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performing because of one tie in the ESSR treatment group. This variable is used to 
investigate who drives peer effects and if they vary depending on the performance 
rank. None of the variables representing the outcomes of the effort task is 
significantly different across treatments.  
 
[Table 3 Here] 
 
As regards the risk elicitation task, the variable Choice represents the number of 
boxes that each student decides to collect in the first performance of the BRET and, 
therefore, his/her ex-ante risk behaviour. In Part I, when all participants perform the 
BRET for the first time, the average number of collected boxes in the whole sample is 
43.1. The majority of participants (58.75%) display risk-averse behaviour (i.e., they 
choose a number of boxes below 50); 16.25 per cent of the sample is risk-neutral and 
the remaining 25% choose to collect more than 50 boxes, thus displaying risk-seeking 
behaviour.48 When looking at the average choice separately by treatments, we see that 
TO has the lowest average number of collected boxes (41.7); PR the highest (44.4) 
and ESSR lies somewhere in the middle. Importantly, there are no significant 
differences across treatment groups49 in terms of participants’ risk behaviour in Part I. 
However, Choice is still an important control variable in our estimates, as ex-ante and 
ex-post risk behaviour are positively and significantly correlated (corr=0.6817, 
p=0.000). 
Choice After is our dependent variable. It represents subjects’ choices when 
they perform the BRET in Part II, after the Coin Task; therefore, it also represents 
their ex-post risk behaviour. In this performance of the BRET, subjects collect an 
average of about 44 boxes overall, meaning that their behaviour is slightly less risk-
averse. About 59.38% of subjects are risk-averse in Part II, 16.88% are risk-neutral 
                                                          
48 See Crosetto and Filippin (2013) for details on how to formalize subjects’ decisions in the BRET. 
49 Two-sample t-tests for the equality of variable means within each pair of treatments show that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of similar mean ex-ante risk behaviour within each pair of treatments. 
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and 23.74% are risk-seeking. Risk behaviour after the Coin Task differs significantly 
across treatments, with participants in the PR and ESSR groups increasing their 
choice to about 46 boxes on average and the TO group decreasing its choice on 
average to 39 boxes. In PR, subjects’ ex-post risk behaviour converges to risk 
neutrality, as about 5.6% of the sample switches from either risk aversion (3.7%) or 
risk propensity (1.9%) to risk neutrality. In ESSR, about 5.8% of the sample, who ex-
ante was risk-averse, become either risk-neutral or risk-seeking. Instead, in the TO 
group, both ex-ante risk-seeking and ex-ante risk-neutral subjects become ex-post 
risk-averse (11.1 percent).  
Most Risky is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for subjects who have the 
highest ex-ante risk propensity within the peer group (on average 47%), and is used 
to control for the possibility that peer effects vary depending on the relative ex-ante 
riskiness ranking within the peer group. 
Finally, we use the last set of variables (together with the variable Choice) to 
check if our randomization was successful in creating comparable treatment groups. 
We find no systematic differences across treatments in any of the individual 
predetermined characteristics, including those that could be correlated with risk-
taking behaviour outside the lab, such as smoking or drinking and neither, as we said 
before, do we find them in ex-ante risk behaviour.50 
 
2.4.2 Incentive Schemes and Peer Effects on Risk Behaviour 
 
Many organizations and educational institutions often use competition for career 
advancement, sought-after jobs or high grades, and teamwork with compensation 
equally shared among group members as incentives for their employees/students to 
                                                          
50 The most worrying of the not statistically significant, but potentially important, differences across 
the groups is the percentage of subjects enrolled in the field of Economics, which is much higher in the 
TO treatment group. In fact, on the one hand, different personality “types” may choose different 
majors; on the other hand, economics training may change how subjects behave under different 
incentive schemes and in laboratory experiments. When we run our main estimates including only 
subjects not enrolled in the field of economics, we find a bigger effect size for the TO treatment (i.e., a 
bigger reduction in peer effects on risk behaviour compared with the piece-rate scheme), but this is less 
precise due to the lower sample size.   
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increase their performance. Evaluations of the effects of these incentive schemes are 
usually limited to the resultant level of workers’/students’ productivity. However, 
besides their effect on performance, incentive schemes could also change the nature 
of peers’ relationships (Ducharme and Martin, 2000; Morrison, 2004; Morgeson and 
Humphrey, 2006; Quigley et al., 2007; Chiaburu and Harrison, 2008; Westover and 
Taylor, 2011; Skaalvik and Skaalvik, 2011; Onemu, 2014) and this, in turn, may have 
an impact on the existence and magnitude of peer effects. 
We hypothesize that competition may hamper peer attachment, because 
competitors work to reach a personal goal that only one of the peers will be able to 
meet; on the contrary, an equal-split-sharing-rule evokes cooperation, working to 
reach a common goal, and this may enhance peers’ relationships. However, it could 
also weaken the relationship if a peer’s performance/contribution does not meet 
individual expectations due to free-riding.51 Thus, compared with a situation where 
earnings depend only on individual performance, we expect peer effects to be smaller 
in magnitude, or absent, in competition because of the rivalry between peers. A less 
clear-cut prediction may be made for peer effects after an equal-split-sharing-rule 
incentive scheme due to the opposite effects of a positive impact on peers and 
disappointment in a peer’s poor performance. If no effect is predominant, then the 
average effect will not be significantly different from peer effects after piece-rate 
compensation.52  
In this section, we investigate whether incentive schemes have an impact on 
peer effects on subsequent risk behaviour by estimating the following model: 
 
                                                          
51 Moreover, if we consider the effort task and the BRET task as a portfolio of lotteries, we could think 
about the former as a lottery in which individuals have less control over both outcomes and 
probabilities than they have in the BRET. In fact, while in the BRET subjects know how much they 
may earn and the probability of it happening for every possible choice, in the effort task, first, they do 
not know how their effort maps into performance and second, when performance is incentivized using 
an equal-split-sharing-rule or a tournament, they are exposed to further uncertainty coming from the 
assigned peer’s ability and performance. So, after playing the first lottery, they may be more desirous 
to control for risk when they can and thus, they may be less influenced by their peers. 
52 Distinguishing the contribution of each of these mechanisms to peer effects is beyond the aims of 
this paper.   
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where ChoiceAfteri is the ex-post risk behaviour of subject i; PeerChoicei represents 
the number of boxes collected by the peer in the first performance of the BRET and 
its effect is our measure of peer influence; Choicei is the subject i’s ex-ante risk 
behaviour; ESSRi and TOi are two dummy variables for the treatment status (PR is the 
reference category); PeerChoicei*ESSRi and PeerChoicei*TOi are the interaction 
variables between the treatment status and the measure of peer influence used to 
analyse heterogeneity in peer effects across treatments; Xi is the vector of our control 
variables included to reduce the error variance, that is, a dummy variable to control 
for gender (Woman), a dummy variable to control for the riskiness rank within the 
pair (Most Risky)53 and a dummy variable describing the outcome of the Coin Task 
(Highest Scoring Within Pair); εi is an error term. 
Our prediction is that, in the absence of peer effects on risk behaviour, we 
should not be able to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient  is equal to zero 
(in the reference category, piece-rate, subjects receive information on the risk 
behaviour of a randomly assigned participant as in the Random Treatment in the first 
chapter). Moreover, if incentive schemes do not have any impact on peer effects on 
risk behaviour, then there should be no reason to expect the coefficients  and  to 
be significantly different from zero and, in particular, if competition does not hamper 
peer effects, there should be no reason to expect the coefficient  to also be negative. 
We define peer effects as a change in the subject’s choices due to non-monetary 
reasons, triggered by the knowledge of their peers’ previous choice and their 
comparison of themselves with their peers. We measure peer effects on risk 
behaviour by computing the change in the subject’s ex-post risk behaviour produced 
by the ex-ante risk behaviour of the randomly assigned peer. This method is common 
                                                          
53 In the first chapter we show that relative riskiness within the group matters, and that peer effects are 
especially strong for individuals whose peers are riskier than they are and who take on average riskier 
decisions, even when controlling for regression to the mean. 
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in most of the literature on peer effects, where the existence of peer influence is 
measured by regressing some individual outcome of person i in group j on the mean 
value of the - pre-determined - outcome for all of the other people in group j 
(Zimmerman, 2003; Mas and Moretti, 2009; Lavy, Silva, and Weinhardt, 2012; 
Balsa, Gandelman and González, 2015). However, there are alternative ways of 
testing the hypothesis we are interested in. For example, in the first chapter we study 
the role of group identity on peer effects on risk behaviour by looking at the standard 
deviation of group choices: lower standard deviations are interpreted as stronger peer 
effects, since they highlight more similar choices within the peer group. Despite the 
similarity of the design, here we decide to carry out our analysis according to the 
former method, rather than using the standard deviations of group choices. In fact, 
after the manipulation of the incentive scheme, peers are no longer under equal 
conditions (for example, after a competition there are winners and losers); therefore, 
the extent to which individuals are influenced by their peers may depend on these 
conditions. By working with individual data, rather than with data collapsed at the 
group level, we may study heterogeneity in peer effects between different outcomes 
of the effort task (see section 2.4.3).54  
Table 4 reports OLS estimates of our model. In column (1), we only control for 
the individual and peer’s ex-ante risk behaviour. We find that overall, subjects are 
significantly influenced by their peer’s choice: given their own initial choice, for each 
additional box collected by the peer, they collect on average 0.15 boxes more. This 
means that the average peer will change their individual ex-post choice by about 6.5 
boxes (0.15*43.1). The magnitude of this effect is slightly less than one third of the 
effect of their own previous choice.  
                                                          
54 When we study peer effects by computing the standard deviation of the boxes collected within the 
pair, keeping only one observation for each pair and estimating the difference-in-differences model �� = + � � � + �� + �( � � � ∗ ��) + ��  as in the first chapter, we 
obtain similar results: we find that the standard deviation of the choices within the pair is significantly 
lower ex-post in the PR and ESSR treatment groups, but not in the TO treatment group. However, the 
difference between PR and TO, although big (3.06 boxes – the average SD is 8.47 boxes), is 
imprecisely estimated and not significant. 
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In column (2), to check if peer effects are significantly different across 
treatments, we include the treatment dummies and the two interaction dummies 
between treatment status and peer choice. The data again show evidence of peer 
effects on risk behaviour: participants in the PR treatment group significantly 
increase their choice in the second performance of the BRET by about 0.20 boxes for 
each additional box collected in the first performance by their randomly assigned 
peer. Peer effects are very similar in size for participants in the ESSR treatment 
group, while they are more than halved when performance is incentivized by using 
competition (Peer Effects in TO=0.06). The interaction terms are imprecisely 
estimated, so the difference in peer effects between the PR and TO groups, despite 
being economically relevant, is not statistically significant. 
A possible source of such imprecision may be heteroscedasticity (White’s 
general test p=0.074; White’s special test p=0.0085). Thus, in addition to using the 
Huber-White estimate of variance, we also estimate WLS (Wooldridge, 2009), by 
using as estimates of the standard deviation function the fitted values of a regression 
having as dependent variable the absolute value of the residuals from our model. The 
assumed heteroscedasticity function produces a weighted model that achieves higher 
precision and that predicts point estimates close to the OLS estimates in column (2). 
The estimate of this weighted model is reported in column (3) and shows that, if the 
proposed model of heteroscedasticity is a reasonable approximation of the true 
unknown model55, then, once heteroscedasticity is controlled for, there is evidence for 
a statistically significant reduction in peer effects on risk behaviour after a 
competition (-0.148, p=0.054).  
Overall, our findings confirm the evidence of peer effects on risk behaviour, 
which has emerged from the economic literature and seem to point to the role played 
                                                          
55 If the assumed heteroscedasticity function is wrong, WLS estimator is generally consistent. There 
are two consequences of using WLS with a wrong variance function. The first is that the computed 
standard errors and test statistics are no longer valid, even in large samples. This issue may be fixed 
using standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity (as with OLS). The second is that the WLS 
estimator is not guaranteed to be more efficient than OLS. However, in cases of strong 
heteroscedasticity, it is often better to use WLS with a wrong variance function, than OLS ignoring 
heteroscedasticity (Wooldridge, 2009).  
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by incentive schemes in peer influence. This is particularly true of tournaments, 
which attenuate peer influence, possibly because of peer rivalry. 
 
[Table 4 Here] 
 
The results remain stable in columns (4) and (5), where we add among the 
regressors our control variables for gender, outcome of the Coin Task and relative 
riskiness rank within the pair. Again, we find that peer effects are statistically 
significant and that, when we take into account heteroscedasticity, performing the 
effort task in competition with a peer significantly attenuates the peer’s influence. 
As far as control variables are concerned, the choice in the first performance of 
the BRET is always an important determinant of subsequent risk behaviour, while the 
outcome of the effort task (Highest Scoring Within Pair) and the relative riskiness 
rank 56  do not play any significant role. Of particular interest is, instead, the 
coefficient of the variable Woman, which shows that women are significantly more 
risk-averse ex-post than men. While ex-ante there are no gender differences in risk 
behaviour57, the higher risk aversion ex-post in women is driven by the PR treatment 
(men’s ChoiceAfter in PR=51.76; women’s ChoiceAfter in PR=44.11; Mann-Whitney 
p=0.0949). There are no statistically significant gender differences in the other two 
treatments but it is interesting to note that, while in the ESSR treatment group, 
women are more risk-averse than men, the opposite is true in the TO group. In 
addition, if we look at ex-post risk behaviour within gender and across treatments, we 
find that men in the TO treatment group are significantly more risk-averse than men 
in PR. This is due to men becoming both significantly more risk-averse after 
                                                          
56 We have also checked whether peer effects are different depending on the relative riskiness rank 
within the pair. We find that overall, peer influence seems more important for subjects with the highest 
ex-ante risk aversion within the pair, but the difference between them and the ex-ante most risk-
seeking subjects is not statistically significant. Also, we do not observe any statistically significant 
difference across treatments in the effect of relative riskiness rank on peer influence. 




competition and significantly more risk-seeking after the piece-rate compensation 
scheme. Finally, there are no gender differences in the impact of peer effects, both 
overall and within treatments. 
 
2.4.3 Outcome of the Effort Task and Subsequent Risk Behaviour 
 
In this section, we consider the fact that the outcome of the incentivized task is 
typically observed by all subjects, and that peers’ relationships typically outlast the 
incentivized task; therefore, subsequent peer influence may be affected by the 
observed outcome.  
Similarly to what happens for relative payoffs concerns, where subjects may 
feel envy if they have a lower monetary payoff and compassion if the inequality in 
income is to their advantage (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), individuals may use 
information on their relative performance in the effort task as an indicator of ability, 
promptness or even luck. They may then experience different feelings about 
themselves or their peers that may, in turn, translate into different levels of peer 
influence. So, peer effects after the incentivized task may vary according to the 
outcome of the task. This effect may already be present in the piece-rate 
compensation scheme if individuals care about their relative performance even 
compared with random co-workers, and it may be different for 
competition/cooperation-based incentive schemes if individuals add concerns about 
the effects of winning/losing or contributing/free-riding to those over relative 
performance.  
In particular, we suggest that the willingness to conform to peers may be 
stronger for the lowest scoring subjects, because they are more likely to perceive their 
peers as better than they are and so may expect them to make a better decision in 
subsequent choices as well (i.e., the BRET). Moreover, this social learning effect may 
get stronger as the difference in performance gets bigger; that is, the better the peer is 
compared to the subject itself. The fact of being teammates instead of random co-
workers may amplify the difference in peer effects between low and high ranked 
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individuals if, besides ability, the act of contributing more to the group’s output 
without free-riding also increases the influence on the lowest scoring peer. On the 
contrary, being competitors may shrink this difference if the losers are less willing to 
imitate the winners because they feel disappointment or anger towards them. 
In Table 5, columns (1) and (2), we estimate the same specification as in Table 
4 column (4) for the subsample of the highest and lowest scoring subjects within the 
pair, respectively. We find that the peers who perform worse do not have a 
statistically significant influence on the highest scoring subjects in any treatments. 
However, while the point estimate is small for both the PR and TO treatment groups, 
we cannot reject the possibility of a modest effect for the ESSR group (0.15), despite 
it being not statistically significant. 
Instead, peer effects are strong and significant for the lowest performing 
subjects. For this subsample, we find again that competition almost halves the size of 
peer effects compared with the piece-rate compensation scheme, while an increase in 
peer influence of similar economic relevance is observed after the cooperation-based 
incentive. However, we do not have enough statistical power to make confident 
conclusions; so, we cannot exclude the possibility that teammates are influenced by 
the more cooperative team member and losers by their winning counterparts in the 
same way that the lowest scoring subjects are influenced by a better performing 
random person.  
In column (3), we estimate on the whole sample the same specification as in 
Table 4 column (4) adding our dummy for being the highest scoring subject within 
the pair in the Coin Task and the full set of interaction terms between the choice of 
the peer, the treatment status and being the highest scoring subject. We run this 
estimation in order to check whether peer effects significantly differ depending on the 
binary outcome of the effort task, as it seems to emerge from columns (1) and (2). 
The only difference between the estimation in column (3) and those included in the 
first two columns is that in the latter all controls can change depending on the score in 
the effort task, while column (3) focuses only on peer effects and treatment status. 
The data show that subjects who obtain the lowest score within the peer group in the 
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PR scheme are significantly influenced by their peers (+0.38, significant at the 1% 
level), while peer effects are significantly smaller and no longer statistically 
significant for subjects who obtain the highest score (coeff.=0.10, p-value=0.438). 
Interaction terms between peer effects and treatment status are never statistically 
significant. However, it is worth commenting on their economic relevance, pointing 
out that while the differences across treatments are close to zero for the highest 
scoring subjects, they become bigger for the lowest scoring subjects: the influence of 
better performing teammates is about one third higher than that of better randomly 
assigned people, while the influence of winners is lower by about a half compared 
with the piece-rate compensation scheme. 
To sum up, the relative rank of performance in the effort task matters, and 
while high performers exert influence, low performers do not. 
 
[Table 5 Here] 
 
Performance in the Coin Task is an important indicator of peers’ homogeneity, which 
in the ESSR group also represents teammates’ contribution to the group output and, 
in the TO group, the margin of the win/defeat. The binary outcome may thus be more 
or less salient depending on the difference in performance. To investigate this, in 
columns (4) to (6), we split our sample according to the absolute value of the 
difference in the number of correct answers within the pair, considering the first 
quartile (<=3), the interquartile range and the fourth quartile (>9.5). In the 
specifications reported in Table 5, we look at the overall heterogeneity in peer effects 
according to the binary outcome for each subsample; when we also add the 
interaction terms with the treatment status (as in column 3), we find again that 




The estimations in columns (4) to (6) suggest that the differences in peer effects 
between the highest and lowest scoring subjects within the pair, and the absence of 
peer influence for the highest scoring participants, come mainly from the right hand 
tail of the distribution of absolute difference in performance: when the difference in 
performance is very big (i.e., for very heterogeneous peer groups), the highest scoring 
subjects are not influenced by their peers; instead, for smaller differences in 
performance, peer effects are statistically similar for the two outcomes (although the 
point estimates of the interaction terms in the first two subsamples are quite big in 
relative terms).  
 
2.4.4 Incentive Schemes, Attachment to Peers and Self-Reported Peer 
Influence 
 
This section analyses if incentive schemes change the individual’s feeling of 
attachment to their assigned peer and their perception of peer influence. We use two 
questions from the final questionnaire to create our measures of attachment to peers 
and perceived peer influence. The first question asks subjects to rate, on a scale from 
0 to 10, how closely attached they felt to their peer throughout the experiment. Based 
on participants’ answers, we create the variable Attached, which takes values between 
0 and 10. On average, subjects’ reported level of attachment is 3.2. The second 
question, used to create an indicator of Self-Reported Peer Influence, asks subjects if, 
in the second performance of the BRET, they considered their peer’s previous choice 
when taking their decision. On average, 55% of subjects state having been influenced 
by their peer’s choice. 
In Table 6, we estimate a linear regression model where we regress Attached 
(columns 1 to 3) and Self-Reported Peer Influence58 (columns 4 to 6) on the two 
treatment dummies (PR is our reference category) and our control variables.  
We find that participants in the TO treatment group feel significantly less 
attached to their peer than individuals in both the PR (-1.1481) and ESSR (-1.7208) 
                                                          
58 Results do not change when we estimate a Probit model. 
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treatment groups, and that they are less likely than in the PR (-0.1667) and ESSR (-
0.2657) groups to admit to having considered their peer’s choice. These results are 
robust when we control for gender, outcome of the effort task and ex-ante risk 
behaviour (columns 2 and 5), as well as when we add to the controls the peer’s ex-
ante risk behaviour and the individual’s choice in the second performance of the 
BRET (columns 3 and 6).  
Our results suggest that incentivizing performance using tournaments has an 
effect on peers’ relationships, as it reduces feelings of attachment to the assigned 
peer. Moreover, despite the absence of a statistically significant change in observed 
behaviour, tournaments significantly attenuate self-reported peer influence. 
 
[Table 6 Here] 
 
 
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper, we study the relationship between incentive schemes and peer effects 
on risk behaviour.  
Risk attitudes are an important driver of many decisions that individuals take in 
their daily lives: what to eat, what to study, where to work, whom to marry, etc. 
Recent evidence shows that they are neither exogenously given by nature nor 
immutable, but are shaped by environmental factors like peer influence. The 
understanding of what determines the existence and magnitude of peer effects on risk 
behaviour has received particular attention because it has been shown that not all 
peers matter and that some matter more than others. We contribute to this research by 
investigating if teammates or competitors exert a different influence compared with 
random peers. 
Work environments and educational institutions often implement incentive 
schemes, such as equal-split-sharing-rules or tournaments, to improve their 
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employees’/students’ performance. By changing the nature of relationships between 
peers, these incentives may affect the extent to which subjects are influenced by their 
peers. Furthermore, since peer interactions outlast the incentivized task, the effects of 
the change in peer influence may spread to subsequent decisions. In addition, in a 
setting of complete information, where employees/students interact and can observe 
each other both before and after the incentivized tasks, peer effects may differ 
depending on the outcome of the incentivized task. 
We answer our research question by collecting data from a laboratory 
experiment with three treatment conditions, which correspond to three different 
compensation schemes: piece-rate, equal-split-sharing-rule and tournament. These are 
associated with a real effort task, the Coin Task, which consists of recognizing the 
value and country of origin of Euro coins. Risk preferences are measured by using the 
Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013), which is performed both 
before and after the Coin Task to measure ex-ante and ex-post risk behaviour, 
respectively. 
We find evidence of peer effects on subsequent risk behaviour that, despite 
being statistically similar across treatments, are economically weaker after 
competition: the influence of a random person is about three times as big as the 
influence of a competitor. This difference becomes significant when we run WLS 
estimates to control for heteroscedasticity. Moreover, the outcome of the incentivized 
task matters, with peer influence on risk behaviour being mostly driven by 
participants with the lowest score in the effort task within the pair. Peer effects are 
instead significantly smaller and no longer statistically significant for subjects who 
obtain the highest score. This result mainly comes from very heterogeneous peer 
groups in terms of performance in the effort task. 
When probing more deeply into the subjects’ feelings, we find that they feel 
significantly less attached to their competitors than to their teammates and random 
peers, and that self-reported peer influence is significantly lower among competitors 
than under the other two incentive schemes. 
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Establishing the existence of peer influence on decisions involving risk is 
important from a policy perspective, because in several environments, policy makers 
or private companies may be interested in influencing individuals’ choices involving 
risk: peer effects may amplify the effects of any intervention because, by targeting a 
few subjects, the effects will spread to their peers as well.  
Also, our results contribute to a better understanding of the different 
consequences of implementing incentive schemes, particularly tournaments. Our 
findings suggest that if peers are viewed as competitors, the feeling of attachment to 
the peer group weakens, as does the likelihood of taking peers’ choices into 
consideration before deciding. It would be interesting to investigate whether there is 
complementarity or substitutability in the influence of different “kinds” of peers, 
whether these results hold under repeated competition and what happens when peer 
groups need to face both cooperative and competitive situations, as is the case in 
many working environments.  
Finally, our evidence that relative performance matters in order for peers to 
exert an influence on subsequent risk behaviour, and that the lowest scoring 
individuals are influenced by the highest scoring individuals but not vice versa, 
highlights that the study of the role played by group size and the composition of the 























Figure 2. Participant’s computer screen 
  
      (a) when performing the BRET          (b) after having chosen to collect 35 boxes 
 












Table 1. Treatments of the experiment 
 
 








Piece Rate (PR) £0.20 per UIO 3 54 27 
Equal-Split-Sharing-Rule 
(ESSR)  
1/2*(£0.20 per UGO) 3 52 26 
Tournament (TO) £0.40 per UIO or £0 3 54 27 
 
Note: UIO denotes unit of individual output; UGO denotes unit of group output; Output denotes the 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 
 Means   
 ALL PR ESSR TO F-stat p-value 
Coin Task       
Total Coins 27.725 27.6667 27.7115 27.7963 .0073  .9928 
Correct 25.55 25.0926 25.7885 25.7778 .2271 .7971 
Wrong 2.175 2.5741 1.9231 2.0185 .4074 .6661 
Highest Scoring Within 
Pair 
.5062 .5 .5192 .5 .0255 .9748 
BRET       
Choice 43.1 44.3704 43.2308 41.7037 .2917 .7474 
Choice After 44.075 46.5185 46.1346 39.6482 3.6129 .0292 
Most Risky 0.4688 0.5 0.4615 0.4444 0.1725 0.8418 
Pred. Charact.       
Female .65 .6852 .5577 .7037 1.4623 .2348 
Age 22.6813 22.4630 22.5385 23.0370 .0934 .9108 
Asian .2438 .2778 .2308 .2222 .2572 .7735 
European .6938 .6852 .6731 .7222 .1619 .8507 
Euro Zone .1063 .1296 .0962 .0926 .2326 .7927 
Economics .3188 .2593 .2692 .4259 2.1803 .1164 
HSS  .5188 .5926 .4808 .4815 .8833 .4155 
MVM .0313 .0370 .0577 0 1.5014 .2260 
Distinction .3688 .3889 .3846 .3333 .2171 .8051 
Mother Uni Degree .5875 .5926 .5577 .6111 .1576 .8543 
Father Uni Degree .6313 .6296 .5769 .6852 .6604 .5181 
Brothers .8 .7037 .9423 .7593 .9777 .3785 
Sisters .8125 .6481 .8462 .9444 1.5082 .2245 
Self-Reported Risk 5.3813 5.0556 5.4615 5.6296 .8191 .4427 
Smoker .1688 .1296 .1538 .2222 .8792 .4171 
Drinker .8938 .8704 .8846 .9259 .4665 .6280 
Observations 160 54 52 54   
Notes: In the last two columns, we report the F-stat and p-value of a test for the equality of variable 
means across all groups. HSS is the Humanities and Social Sciences degree. MVM is the Medicine 









Table 4. Incentive Schemes and Peer Effects on Risk Behaviour 
  




   Weighted  Weighted 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Peer Choice 0.1501*** 0.1979** 0.2327*** 0.2397** 0.2808*** 
 (0.0513) (0.0865) (0.0611) (0.0922) (0.0714) 
Choice 0.5523*** 0.5508*** 0.5487*** 0.5199*** 0.5214*** 
 (0.0690) (0.0674) (0.0658) (0.0821) (0.0779) 
Peer Choice*ESSR  -0.0313 -0.0872 -0.0405 -0.0943 
  (0.1172) (0.0964) (0.1183) (0.0952) 
Peer Choice* TO  -0.1358 -0.1480* -0.1202 -0.1434* 
  (0.1255) (0.0762) (0.1298) (0.0857) 
Equal-Split-Sharing-Rule  1.8235 4.3309 1.8798 4.7406 
  (5.9559) (5.1727) (5.8843) (4.8365) 
Tournament  0.7885 1.3876 0.3638 1.9840 
  (6.3559) (4.4818) (6.5270) (4.8208) 
Woman    -3.6733* -4.1653** 
    (1.8778) (1.8546) 
Highest Scoring Within Pair    -1.4957 -1.9300 
    (1.6918) (1.5808) 
Most Risky    2.2905 2.3670 
    (2.2349) (2.1414) 
Constant 13.8046*** 13.2975*** 11.8026*** 14.9347*** 13.2005*** 
 (3.4732) (5.0431) (4.2157) (5.1338) (4.3563) 
Peer Effects in ESSR  0.1666** 0.1455* 0.1992** 0.1865** 
  (0.0798) (0.0752) (0.0881) (0.0773) 
Peer Effects in TO  0.0621 0.0847* 0.1195 0.1374** 
  (0.0927) (0.0480) (0.1020) (0.0626) 
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 
Adj. R-squared 0.490 0.510 0.545 0.518 0.571 
Standard errors (corrected for heteroscedasticity) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * 
indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Peer Effects in ESSR and Peer Effects in TO are computed as the linear combination of the coefficient 










Table 5. Outcomes of the Effort Task and Peer Effects on Subsequent 
Risk Behaviour  
         
















 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Peer Choice 0.1009 0.3734***  0.3812***  0.3195* 0.3601*** 0.4446** 
 (0.1466) (0.1066)  (0.1052)     (0.1718) (0.1123) (0.1973) 
Peer Choice*ESSR 0.0517 0.1484  0.1415        
 (0.1745) (0.1543)  (0.1593)        
Peer Choice* TO -0.0129 -0.1637  -0.1737        
 (0.2048) (0.1318)  (0.1339)        
Peer Choice* Highest 
Scoring Within Pair 
   -0.2767*  







Peer Choice*ESSR* Highest 
Scoring Within Pair 
   -0.1168 
(0.2272)      
    
Peer Choice* TO* Highest 
Scoring Within Pair 
   0.1393 
(0.2445)      
    
ESSR* Highest Scoring 
Within Pair 
   7.3707 
(11.0539)     
    
TO* Highest Scoring Within 
Pair 
   -1.2169 
(12.1174)     
    
Highest Scoring Within Pair    8.0095     6.4083 8.5158 16.3823* 
    (7.5971)     (10.5283) (6.6324) (8.7612) 
Choice 0.4643*** 0.5362***  0.5080***  0.5752*** 0.4406*** 0.5518*** 
 (0.1414) (0.0991)  (0.0819)     (0.1628) (0.1314) (0.1239) 
Equal-Split-Sharing-Rule -0.1763 -7.2984  -6.7533     5.1430 -1.6493 -0.6523 
 (8.2884) (7.3446)  (7.6241)     (4.1141) (3.4625) (4.0318) 
Tournament -0.8375 0.9509  1.3022     -5.8817* -0.8456 -3.1101 
 (10.5738) (5.8779)  (5.9495)     (3.1024) (4.2664) (2.8420) 
Woman -1.7002 -5.9525**  -3.6983**   -0.4816 -2.7928 -8.1251** 
 (2.5793) (2.4341)  (1.7843)     (3.5219) (3.6745) (3.3636) 
Most Risky 4.8680 3.0174  3.7293     2.6954 3.1853 3.9336 
 (3.7767) (3.1079)  (2.4222)     (3.9188) (4.4584) (3.3783) 
Constant 17.1439** 10.0700*  8.9995*    6.1136 10.4248 8.6130 
 (7.6893) (5.9926)  (5.3985)     (8.5639) (7.5633) (9.9560) 
Observations 81 79  160     58 62 40 
Adj. R-squared 0.400 0.632  0.532     0.490 0.538 0.603 
In Table 5 columns (1) and (2) we run the same specification as in Table 4 column 4 in the subsamples indicated 
by the columns’ label. In the remaining columns, we also add interaction terms with the outcome of the coin task. 
Standard errors (corrected for heteroscedasticity) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that 
the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Equal-Split-Sharing-Rule 0.5726 0.4617 0.4546 0.0990 0.1005 0.1048    
 (0.5071) (0.5207) (0.5191) (0.0945) (0.0963) (0.0962)    
Tournament -1.1481** -1.1551** -1.0231** -0.1667* -0.1676* -0.1673*   
 (0.4513) (0.4533) (0.4404) (0.0958) (0.0971) (0.1001)    
Woman  -0.6846 -0.5725  0.0125 0.0036    
  (0.4531) (0.4571)  (0.0856) (0.0866)    
Highest Scoring Within 
Pair 
 0.2720 0.3259  -0.0338 -0.0372    
  (0.3765) (0.3667)  (0.0815) (0.0824)    
Most Risky  -0.6837* -0.8418  -0.0324 0.0461    
  (0.4121) (0.5828)  (0.0937) (0.1224)    
Choice  0.0069 -0.0068  0.0004 -0.0001    
  (0.0128) (0.0165)  (0.0025) (0.0033)    
Peer Choice   -0.0087   0.0031    
   (0.0141)   (0.0028)    
Choice After   0.0295   -0.0016    
   (0.0184)   (0.0036)    
Constant 3.3889*** 3.7591*** 3.3562*** 0.5741*** 0.5797*** 0.5088*** 
 (0.3696) (0.7545) (0.8927) (0.0679) (0.1375) (0.1836)    
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160    
Adj. R-squared 0.071 0.075 0.079 0.036 0.014 0.008    
Standard errors (corrected for heteroscedasticity) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * 
















Competition and subsequent risk-taking behaviour: 





This paper studies if competition affects subsequent risk-taking behaviour and if such an 
effect is heterogeneous across gender. We run a laboratory experiment in which the rewards 
of a real effort task consisting in recognizing the value and country of origin of Euro coins 
(Coin Task) are determined on the basis of a tournament between two subjects, in the 
treatment group, and of a random draw of the same monetary payoffs for pairs of subjects in 
the control group. Risk behaviour is measured after the incentivized task by using the Bomb 
Risk Elicitation Task. We find that competition increases risk aversion, especially for males, 
but not in a significant manner. When conditioning on the outcome, we find that males 
become significantly more risk averse after losing a competition than after randomly earning 
the same low payoff. In contrast, males do not become more risk-seeking after they win the 
tournament, while females’ average risk-taking behaviour is unaffected by participation in 
the tournament and its outcomes. We interpret our findings in terms of males’ reaction to 
negative outcomes driven by intrinsic motives, such as emotions or a shift in the locus of 
control from internal to external. 
 
 
Keywords: Competition, Risk behaviour, Gender 
 





3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Every day people are faced with many decisions involving risk. Most of such 
decisions have economic relevance and affect not only individuals’ immediate well-
being but also their long-term situation. Recent research in economics has shown that 
risk attitudes are shaped by life experiences and by the characteristics of the 
environment. 59  Our paper contributes to this emerging literature by studying the 
effect of competition on subsequent risk behaviour and its heterogeneity along the 
gender dimension. 
People compete for better paid jobs, for career advancements, for mates, and for 
monetary and non-monetary rewards. In general, competition is widely used as 
incentive scheme. It constitutes an important motivating device especially in 
situations where measuring absolute performance is difficult and where common 
shocks that affect performance are highly likely. Competition may be a useful 
incentive also when performance evaluation is subjective because, in such situations, 
employees’ motivation may be weakened by the employer’s incentives to underreport 
performance (to avoid additional payments like bonuses) or by his reluctance to 
distinguish between good or bad performance in order to avoid inequalities. The fact 
that risk attitudes and competitiveness may correlate is rather intuitive, as 
tournaments typically imply uncertain outcomes. Thus, the decision to enter the 
competition and the behaviour in a competitive environment are naturally influenced 
by subjects’ risk attitudes. 
In this paper, we go one step further and analyse the possible consequences of 
competitive endeavours on risk behaviour. Being exposed to some risk while 
competing, due to the random component of the outcomes, may have carryover 
effects on future decisions involving risk, even without competitive incentives. 
                                                          
59  For instance, Booth and Nolen (2012) find that women’s risk preferences react to the gender 
composition of the education environment. Eckel et al. (2009) show that Hurricane Katrina evacuees 
exhibit risk-loving behaviour shortly after the disaster, while an opposite reaction is reported by 
Cameron and Shah (2015), who instead find that individuals in Indonesian villages that had suffered 
from a flood or an earthquake exhibit a long-lasting increase in risk aversion. 
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However, the randomness in the outcome is not the only source of uncertainty that 
competitors in a tournament face. A second source of uncertainty arises from the 
nature of tournaments because they require agents to think strategically about their 
competitors’ effort or decisions (Bull, Schotter and Weigelt, 1987).60 Being exposed 
to such a strategic uncertainty while competing may in turn affect subsequent 
decisions involving risk even if they do not require any strategic thinking.  
Uncertainty is not the only link between competition and subsequent risk-taking 
behaviour. Competitive pressure in the lab also involves stress (Buckert et al., 2015; 
Zhong et al., 2016), and acute stress has been shown to affect decisions under risk 
(Starckle and Brand, 2012). Competitive endeavours may also trigger a set of 
different emotions and feelings (Cerin and Barnett, 2006; Kräkel, 2008), and 
emotions have been shown to play an important role in decision-making under risk.61 
Finally, subjects performing in a competitive environment know that the outcome is 
not a pure chance event because their ability and effort also matter. How subjects 
weigh the role played by their characteristics with that played by luck may have 
carryover effects as long as their locus of control gets affected.  
Whatever the cause, investigating whether the competitiveness of the 
environment can in turn shape subsequent decisions under risk is important because 
the analysis of competition is usually focused only on its immediate effects on 
productivity. Competition as a one-shot phenomenon is mainly an abstraction of 
laboratory experiments, while choices are usually taken in situations where 
competition occurs repeatedly or is followed by other decisions.62 Hence, besides 
                                                          
60 As explained by Bull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987), “The agents will have to take into account two 
sources of uncertainty. One of these is a part of the existing theoretical literature, namely, the 
distribution of the prizes induced by the randomness in production [..]. The second source of 
uncertainty, which is not in the literature, is precisely the uncertainty concerning how the specific 
tournament that the agent enters will be played”. 
61 Conte et al. (2013) find that four specific emotional states (joviality, sadness, fear, and anger) induce 
risk-seeking behaviour, while Campos-Vazquez and Cuilty (2014) report that risk aversion increases 
with sadness. Bassi et al. (2013) attribute to subjects mood the role of mediator between weather 
conditions and risk-taking behaviour. 
62 Gill and Prowse (2014) study how the outcome of competition affects the productivity of men and 
women in subsequent competitive interactions. They find that for women losing per se is detrimental to 
productivity, while for men such an effect is observed only when the prize at stake is big enough. 
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short-run effects on performance, the exposure to competition may have long-run 
consequences and the change in risk attitudes may constitute a transmission 
mechanism. 
We answer our research question through a laboratory experiment in which 
competition occurs in the Coin Task, a real effort task that consists in recognizing the 
value and country of origin of Euro coins. We measure participants’ risk preferences 
by using the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013), where 
subjects have to choose how many boxes to collect out of 100, 99 of which contain 
10 Euro cents while one contains a bomb that destroys the earnings. We then 
compare risk preferences between subjects in a treatment in which the rewards in the 
Coin Task are determined in a tournament within pairs and subjects in a baseline 
condition, in which comparable payoffs are instead randomly assigned. Such a 
(between-subject) design allows us to control for another reason why competition 
may affect subsequent risk-taking, namely social comparison. Competition induces 
ex-post inequality, thereby making relative earnings salient in models such as Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002). There is a growing literature 
showing that social comparison plays indeed a relevant role in decisions under risk 
(Linde and Sonnemans, 2012; Gamba et al., 2014; Fafchamps et al., 2015; Schmidt et 
al., 2015). Our design allows us to control for wealth effects and focus on the effect 
of competition on risk-taking behaviour net of any social comparison consideration.  
We also aim at investigating whether the relationship between the 
competitiveness of the environment and risk behaviour is different for men and 
women. Some contributions in the literature claim that women are more risk-averse 
than men (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009) although the 
estimated gender difference in risk attitudes depends on the method used to measure 
risk attitudes (Filippin and Crosetto, 2016). On the other hand, the literature has 
documented significant gender differences in the level of fondness for competition 
and in performance in competitive situations (Gneezy et al., 2003). At least since 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Haenni (2016) finds in a sample of amateur tennis players that it takes on average 10% longer to 
compete again after losing than after winning. 
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Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), it has been shown that women tend to shy away 
from competition. The combination of these two strands of the literature suggested 
that even unequal outcomes in the labour market can be rationalized by the fact that 
women are less willing to engage in competitive endeavours because they are more 
risk-averse (Booth and Nolen, 2012). However, while the gender gap in tournament 
entry has been largely replicated, the role played by risk attitudes has been further 
investigated showing a limited impact.63 In light of this evidence, we believe that it is 
worth investigating whether competition affects risk preferences differently for men 
and women. For example, if women are both more risk-averse and less willing to 
engage in competition than men, after being exposed to the risk of a competitive 
endeavour they may be more likely to avoid further - although independent - risk. 
Similarly, since men like competition more and tend to perform better, after the 
competitive experience, they may be more likely to take on further risk.64 
Our results suggest that on average competition does not affect risk-taking 
behaviour. When investigating gender heterogeneity, we still find that, for both 
genders, performing the Coin Task in a tournament does not significantly change risk 
aversion as compared to the baseline condition, even though the difference in the 
risky choice in the baseline and after competing is quite large for males. 
An interesting finding about males’ behaviour emerges when disaggregating the 
results by both gender and outcomes: males become significantly more risk averse 
after they lose the tournament than after they earn the same payoff in the baseline 
treatment. There is instead no evidence of a more risk-seeking behaviour after 
winning the tournament. As regards females, their risk behaviour is unaffected by 
participating in the tournament and by its outcome. Since our design does not allow 
for causal inference on outcome-related effects of competition, this further 
                                                          
63 See Niederle (2016) and references therein. 
64 Some papers have documented that also stress may have an effect on choices under risk that is 
different for men and women. Lighthall et al. (2009) run an experiment where participants play the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al., 2002), a computer game measuring risk taking, fifteen 
minutes after completing a stress challenge or control task. They find that acute stress amplifies sex 
differences in risk-seeking: men take more risk under stress while women become more risk averse. 
Similarly, Ceccato et al. (2015) study the relationship between stress and risk-taking in the gain 
domain and find that women generally take less risk and report slightly higher stress levels than men.  
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investigation on the role played by winning or losing is only suggestive. However, 
several mechanisms may explain the pattern of observed results. On one hand, since 
winning or losing is not only a pure chance event but also relies upon individual 
characteristics, such as ability or effort, losing a tournament may trigger a feeling of 
loss of control over one’s outcomes, or, in other words, is likely to shift the locus of 
control from internal to external. By thinking that their decisions are controlled by 
environmental factors which they cannot influence, males who lose may become less 
confident in their probability of succeeding even in a pure chance task and therefore 
become more risk-averse. Beisswingert et al. (2016) indeed show that exogenously 
determining a loss of control induces a more risk averse behaviour.65 On the other 
hand, the relationship between losing the competition and having a higher degree of 
risk aversion may be explained by the emotions induced by tournaments. Subjects 
feel joy, pride, self-esteem when outperforming their opponent, whereas they feel 
sadness, disappointment, anger and low self-esteem when falling behind.  
Up to our knowledge, very few contributions investigate the effect of 
competition on subsequent decisions under risk, and they do not emphasize a direct 
effect of competition on risk behaviour at the individual level. The second chapter of 
the thesis studies the impact of peer effects on risk behaviour under different 
incentive schemes, including tournaments. Here, instead of comparing different 
incentive schemes, we look only at competition and study the direct effect of 
introducing competition on individual risk-taking behaviour in an environment in 
which individuals cannot observe their peers’ risk behaviour and so cannot be 
influenced by them when making decisions involving risk. Apicella et al. (2014) 
study the effect of changes in the level of testosterone induced by winning or losing a 
rock-paper-scissors tournament on subsequent willingness to take risk. They report an 
increase in testosterone levels after the tournament, higher for winners than for losers, 
                                                          
65 Beisswingert et al. (2016) propose a computer game in which participants have to predict where an 
object would be displayed on a circle by recognizing the systematic pattern underlying the previously 
displayed objects. They show that manipulating the degree of difficulty of the task induces 
significantly more risk-averse choices in the Devil’s task (Slovic, 1966), a risk elicitation method that 
has many features in common with the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET) that we use. 
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and greater for subjects who win by a tighter margin. The authors find that 
testosterone significantly correlates with the decision of taking more risk in a multiple 
price list task. However, Apicella et al. (2014) use a task that is based on pure chance, 
similar to our baseline condition. But competition is not a pure chance event, because 
ability and effort also matter. So, to study the effect of competition on subsequent risk 
behaviour, we use an effort task and design the incentives in order to compare the 
effects of a competition with those of a tournament based only on chance. Also, while 
Apicella et al. (2014) do not study the behaviour of females, we offer also some 
insights on gender differences. Finally, Buser (2016) studies the effect of competition 
on the willingness to seek further challenges. He finds that when subjects perform at 
the individual level the same task (adding two-digit numbers) in which they have 
previously lost in a winner-takes-all tournament, they tend to set a higher 
performance target to meet for payment but also to perform worse. In Buser (2016) 
risk attitudes act as a mediator between competition and the decisions in the second 
stage. However, decisions also depend on ability and effort, which instead do not play 
any role in our setting as we administer a pure risk task. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 describes the tasks adopted 
as well as the experimental design and procedures. In Section 3.3, we present the 
results of the experiment, first at the aggregate level, and then disaggregated by 
gender and outcome in the tournament. Section 3.4 concludes. 
 
 
3.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
The experiment entails the exogenous manipulation of the degree of competitiveness 
of a real effort task performed before eliciting subjects’ risk preferences. We 
implement two conditions in a between-subject design: a treatment in which the 
rewards in the real effort task are decided by a tournament within pairs of subjects 
(Competition), and a control condition in which comparable payoffs are instead 
exogenously assigned (Baseline). 
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The real effort task that subjects perform is the Coin Task. A similar task has 
been used by Belot and Schröder (2013, 2016) to study counterproductive behaviour 
and monitoring. The Coin Task consists of recognizing the value and country of 
origin of Euro coins. Participants see on the left-hand side of their computer screen a 
table with Euro coins of different values from several countries, and on the right-hand 
side a coin randomly drawn from the table (see Figure 1). The task of the subjects is 
to identify the value and the country of the selected coin. After the answer is 
submitted, a new table and a new coin to identify appear on the subject’s screen. 
Participants have five minutes to recognize as many coins as possible. The score is 
the number of coins successfully recognized, with no penalty for wrong answers. 
 
[Figure 1 Here] 
 
The main advantage of this task in comparison to other real effort tasks is that 
in the Coin Task subjects may in principle get all of the answers correct, provided 
that they exert enough effort. This doesn’t of course mean that ability or knowledge 
do not help, as people who are very good may be faster at the task and their effort 
cost may be lower; however, no specific knowledge is required to answer correctly. 
Also, there is no gender stereotype associated with the task and it is very easy to 
understand and perform. 
The Coin Task is always played in groups of two and the rules for the payment 
determine our treatment conditions. Treated participants are in competition with their 
randomly determined opponent: the subject reaching the highest score gets 8 Euros 
while the other one gets 2 Euros.66  Participants in the baseline receive the same 
monetary payoffs (one player 2 Euros, the other 8 Euros), which are randomly 
assigned so that there is no competition, and they know their payoffs prior to 
                                                          
66 Possible ties are broken first by looking at the total number of attempts, i.e., also including wrong 
answers in the score. In case of a further tie, we look at the time taken to identify the coins correctly. 
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engaging in the real effort task. Monetary rewards in both treatments are conditional 
upon identifying at least 5 coins, otherwise the payoff is zero. We do so for the effort 
task to be perceived as incentivized in both conditions and, therefore, to avoid house-
money effects (Kahneman et al., 1990, 1991; Thaler and Johnson, 1990). The chosen 
threshold is low in order to avoid losing observations because subjects do not earn a 
positive amount. 
The focus of our research is the pure effect of competition on subsequent risk-
taking behaviour and, therefore, we want to avoid the possible confound represented 
by wealth effects. Wealth effects may affect risk-taking both in absolute and in 
relative terms. First, previous earning can shape participants’ willingness to take risks 
by cushioning the impact of bad outcomes in the BRET. Higher earnings in the Coin 
Task could induce a more risk-seeking behaviour in the BRET and such an effect do 
not need to be linear.67 For the sake of minimizing the heterogeneity in the outcomes 
we opt for fixed prizes in the tournament (either 2 or 8 Euros), rather than for rewards 
that change at the margin with individual productivity. To be salient, however, 
competition needs to map into different outcomes for winners and losers and this 
leads to the second concern. Earning different amounts may affect choices under risk 
via social comparison. For this reason, we add the baseline condition in which 
subjects are randomly matched in pairs and receive the same rewards that are 
however randomly assigned instead of determined by the relative performance.68 
Social comparison based on monetary outcomes is expected to be the same in the two 
conditions and will therefore cancel out when considering the difference across them. 
Thus, the comparison across conditions allows us to isolate the pure effect of 
competition on risk behaviour. 
                                                          
67 For instance, Crosetto and Filippin (2013) show that earnings in previous tasks have a U-shape 
effect on subsequent choices in the BRET. The most risk-averse choice follows a payoff of about 2 
Euros, while higher and lower earnings are associated to more risk-seeking decisions. 
68 Our baseline condition allows us to control for wealth effects. We opted for an earlier risk resolution 
(knowledge of own earnings) to avoid uncertainty to play any role during the effort task in the 
baseline. One possible extension useful to separate the role of uncertainty due to the randomness in the 
outcome from strategic uncertainty could be an additional baseline condition where earnings are 
randomly determined but known at the end of the effort task. 
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After the completion of the Coin Task, we elicit subjects’ risk preferences by 
using the BRET (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013). The BRET is a simple risk elicitation 
method in which participants see on their computer screen a field containing 100 
boxes, as shown in Figure 2. A subject has to choose how many boxes to collect 
knowing that 99 boxes contain 10 Euro cents while one contains a bomb that, if 
collected, destroys the earnings. Boxes are collected in numerical order starting from 
the top-left corner and ending at the box corresponding to the participant’s chosen 
number. The bomb can be in any box with the same probability and its position is 
randomly determined at the end of the experiment, i.e., after the choice is made, in 
order to avoid truncation of the data. The BRET allows to span the whole domain of 
risk preferences, with a risk neutral choice (under CRRA preferences) corresponding 
to 50 boxes. A higher (lower) choice identifies risk-seeking (aversion). After 
selecting a number of boxes, subjects are informed about the lottery they are going to 
play. The chosen number of boxes is shown in light grey and the potential earnings 
and their corresponding probabilities are explicitly described. Participants may 
change their choice as many times as they like before confirming it. 
 
[Figure 2 Here] 
 
We elicit risk attitudes only once, after the effort task. The reason is that we want to 
avoid possible confounds, such as negative correlation among subsequent choices, 
hedging, or possible violation of the Reduction Axiom that could stem from 
additional risk elicitations. In Crosetto and Filippin (2013), the authors suggest to 
implement a one-shot versions of the BRET, stressing that a lower risk aversion could 






3.2.1 Experimental Procedure 
 
The experiment took place at the University of Milan in March 2016. It was 
programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited using the 
ORSEE software (Greiner, 2015) ensuring a balanced representation by gender.  
Upon their arrival subjects entered the laboratory and were randomly assigned 
to computer terminals, separated by partitions. After reading aloud the instructions 
illustrating the Coin Task, participants were solicited to raise questions. Once all 
doubts had been privately dispelled, the first stage of the experiment began. 
Participants were randomly matched in pairs and were given the chance to 
practice for one minute in order to familiarize with the Coin Task. Coins identified 
during this minute did not add to the final score. They had then five minutes to 
perform the incentivized task, which consisted in recognizing as many coins as 
possible. Before starting, subjects were asked to guess the number of coins they were 
going to correctly identify and whether this number was higher, equal, or lower than 
the average of the other participants. We ask these questions in order to elicit 
subjects’ expectations and be able to build a proxy for overconfidence. At the end of 
the real effort task, subjects were told their own score and, in the competition 
treatment, also the outcome of the tournament. Subjects were not told their peer’s 
score. 
The experimenter then read aloud the instructions of the BRET and participants 
were given again the opportunity to clear up any doubts individually. Subjects played 
the BRET and, after submitting their choice, completed a short questionnaire. The 
position of the bomb was then randomly determined at the individual level. Subjects 
were notified about their final earnings (2.5 Euros of show-up fee, plus their earnings 
in both the Coin Task and the BRET), received their payment in a sealed envelope 








A total of 130 subjects took part in the experiment: 62 in the baseline and 68 in the 
competition treatment. Table 1 presents summary statistics of our main variables 
separately for the two conditions. The last column of the table reports the p-value of a 
Mann-Whitney test for the equality of the variable means across the two conditions. 
Subjects in the two conditions are homogeneous in terms of individual 
characteristics such as gender, age and ability. Females represent 42 percent of 
subjects in the baseline and 53 percent of treated subjects but the difference is not 
statistically significant. Participants in the whole sample are on average 21 years old.  
In order to perform the Coin Task subjects do not need any specific cognitive 
ability. A sufficient amount of effort is enough to get a correct answer. However, 
subjects endowed with higher levels of speed of thought, patience and ability to focus 
may be faster than other subjects and thus more likely to win.69 In order to control for 
the effect of differences in ability, in the final questionnaire we ask the average grade 
obtained over the first semester of the academic year (Average Grade). Grades range 
from 18 to 31 (30 cum laude) and participants report an average grade of 25.4 in the 
baseline and 26 in the treatment (not significant difference).  
 
[Table 1 Here] 
 
In what follows we present the results of our experiment starting from the real effort 
task to then focus on our main variable of interest, i.e., risk behaviour. We comment 




                                                          
69 Different knowledge of Euro Coins is not an issue in our dataset because all students have the Euro 
as national currency. 
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3.3.1 Coin Task 
 
A comparison of the performance in the Coin Task across treatments allows us to 
check the effectiveness of our incentive scheme. In the baseline participants have to 
correctly identify only five coins in order to earn their payoff, while in the 
competition treatment their earnings also depend on their relative performance. Table 
1 shows that competition improves subjects’ performance, as expected. Subjects in 
the baseline try on average 23.6 coins, 21.6 of which are correctly identified. The 
corresponding figures are significantly higher when subjects perform the Coin Task 
in competition: the number of coins attempted on average is 26.8 with an average of 
24.3 correct answers.70 
As regards the gender dimension, we find that females perform significantly 
worse than males (Table 2). However, differences in the performance are significant 
both in the baseline and in the competition treatment and are of similar size.71 Hence, 
gender differences in competitiveness do not seem to play any role.72 
 






                                                          
70 The high performance in the Baseline conditions can be rationalized by the fact that subjects dislike 
inactivity in the lab and tend to avoid it even at a cost such as exerting effort (see Jensenius, 2017, and 
references therein). 
71  Estimates of the differences-in-differences model �� = + � � +� + � � ∗ � +  show that the gender differences across conditions 
( = −0.8) do not statistically differ. 
72 Many studies have shown that the competitiveness of the environment may induce a gender gap in 
performance. Starting from Gneezy et al. (2003) this result has been largely replicated particularly in 
mixed-gender competition and using stereotypical male endeavours, such as solving mazes and math 
tasks (Shurchkov, 2012). Niederle (2016) also notes that not all the tasks are suitable to measure 
changes in performance under different incentive schemes. For instance, no change in performance is 
observed using the task of adding five two-digit numbers as in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). This is 
likely the case of the Coin task, too, as a similar effect of competition on performance across gender is 
also found with the data from the second chapter. 
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3.3.2 Risk Behaviour 
 
In this section we answer our main research question, namely whether competition 
affects risk behaviour, possibly in a different way along the gender perspective.  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of our main variables of interest and 
shows that on average subjects are risk-averse in both conditions.73 Competition does 
not significantly affect risk aversion: subjects in the baseline collect about 43.5 boxes 
on average, while the corresponding figure for the treated is about 39.5, but the 
difference is not statistically significant.  
Therefore, at first glance, competition does not seem to produce additional 
effects as compared to the baseline condition. However, since males and females 
have been shown to have different levels of fondness for competition (Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2007), they may experience the competition differently; so, potential 
effects on subsequent risk behaviour may be different for males and females. To 
investigate gender heterogeneity we split our sample by gender considering the 
overall data by treatment. We find a potentially important effect for males, whose 
difference in the BRET choice (46.61 in the baseline vs 39.25 in competition) is quite 
large though not significant at conventional levels (Table 3). In contrast, females’ 
behaviour is not affected by the treatment. 
 
[Table 3 Here] 
 
As already described in the introduction, there are several reasons why competition 
may affect subsequent risk behaviour, such as uncertainty of the outcomes, stress, 
loss/gain of control, emotions, and social comparison. By comparing decisions of 
individuals who experienced competition with those of individuals ending up in the 
same financial situation without competing, our design allows us to control for the 
randomness in the outcomes, wealth effects as well as for what the payoffs trigger in 
                                                          
73 A risk-neutral choice in the BRET corresponds to choosing 50 boxes. 
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terms of emotions or superstition.74 We can therefore isolate the effect of competition 
that can be outcome dependent, over and above its monetary consequences.  
We do so in Table 4 reporting the average decision in the BRET separately by 
treatment and outcome. Data show that on average subjects in competition choose to 
collect 38.2 boxes when experiencing the bad outcome and 40.7 boxes after 
experiencing the good outcome, while the corresponding figures in the baseline are 
42.2 and 44.7, respectively. However, none of the differences reaches traditional 
significance levels. 
It is worth noting that the study of the existence of outcome-dependent effects 
of competition on subsequent risk-taking behaviour comes at the price of introducing 
some endogeneity. Indeed, due to differences between baseline and competition 
groups in how outcomes are determined, the characteristics of subjects who 
experience, e.g., a good outcome, may vary between the baseline and competition 
groups. This means that when we look at the effect of competition on risk preferences 
by disaggregating the data according to the outcome we may be varying both the 
degree of competition and demographics or other characteristics. We can only 
partially deal with this by also estimating regressions including demographic 
controls. Therefore, we acknowledge that our outcome-related evidence is only 
suggestive and should be investigated in depth in a controlled manner. 
 
[Table 4 Here] 
 
Results with aggregate data may hide important effects that are outcome-dependent: 
losers may become more risk-averse if, for example, a bad outcome induces a shift in 
their locus of control. In contrast, winners may become more risk-seeking if they 
think to be better able to beat the odds. These effects can also be gender-specific, so 
                                                          
74 Here by superstition we mean thoughts like “I got the bad outcome, so I will be unlucky again” or 
instead “I have been unlucky the first time, I will be lucky the second time”. 
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in Table 5 we further break down the data both by gender and by outcome in the 
effort task. 
By conditioning the gender analysis on the level of payoffs, we find that 
nothing emerges for females, whose average choice is rather stable across conditions 
and outcomes. In contrast, an interesting pattern emerges for males, who become 
significantly more risk averse when losing the tournament as compared to receiving 
the low payoff in the baseline. No statistically significant effect is instead observed 
when they win the tournament as compared to earning the same amount of money in 
the baseline. 75 
 
[Table 5 Here] 
 
Note that by focusing only on the BRET choices of participants in the tournament, 
one could be tempted to infer that males are affected by the outcome of the 
competition becoming more risk seeking after winning than after losing (42.44 vs. 
35.14). However, once wealth effects are taken into account, competition does not 
induce a more risk seeking behaviour for winners: if we compare the choices in 
competition with the corresponding choices in the baseline, we see that winning the 
tournament does not make males more risk seeking.76 Therefore, in the subsample of 
males, winners become relatively less risk-averse than losers, but competition does 
not increase their risk tolerance as compared to subjects earning the same amount of 
money without competing. 77 
                                                          
75  The differences-in-differences model ℎ � = + � � ++ � � ∗ +  estimated in the subsample of males 
shows a difference = .0  with t-stat=0.34. 
76 We cannot exclude a false negative in the Good Outcome case, possibly because of the low number 
of observations, but note that the point estimate goes in the opposite direction as what one might 
expect. 
77  A differences-in-differences regression estimated on the whole sample including demographic 
controls confirms evidence of a statistically significant effect of competition only on males obtaining 
the bad outcome. 
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Our results are not compatible with stress being the link between competition 
and risk taking. Other mechanisms may rationalize why males become more risk 
averse when losing the tournament. One possible explanation is that the negative 
outcome in the tournament may arouse emotions (over and above those triggered by 
the level of the payoffs) which, in turn, affect the subsequent decision under risk. 
Alternatively, the negative outcome may induce a shift in the locus of control. Losing 
may reduce the extent to which one believes that he can predict or influence future 
events and this may, in turn, increase risk aversion.  
Competition is not a pure chance event because outcomes are also influenced 
by ability or effort. Therefore, a negative outcome may have a stronger effect for 
males who perform better. The reason is that losing despite an effective completion of 
the effort task may raise more intense emotions or induce a stronger shift in the locus 
of control. Indeed, we find that the higher the performance in the Coin Task of males 
losing the competition, the higher their risk aversion (corr ChoiceBRET, Correct=-
0.63, p=0.0153). We are aware that a possible reverse causality link may exist 
between the two variables, as a higher risk aversion may simply induce to optimally 
choose a higher level of effort in the Coin Task. If purely endogenous, however, such 
a relationship should hold in general, while we observe it only for males losing the 
tournament. Figure 3 shows that a negative correlation between risk-seeking 
behaviour and performance in the Coin task does not characterize males who win the 
tournament (left-hand panel). 78 Since one could argue that this comparison is made 
difficult by a different average performance, the right-hand panel compares all the 
subjects losing the tournament, showing that females’ choices under risk are not 
related to their performance.  
 
[Figure 3 Here] 
                                                          
78 When we restrict the observations to the performance range where we observe both males winning 
and males losing, we still find evidence of a negative relationship between performance and risk-




Table 6 provides an econometric representation of this evidence. In the first two 
columns, we restrict the analysis to the subsample of males in the tournament 
treatment and compare the effect for winners and losers (as in the left-hand panel of 
Figure 3). In columns (3) and (4), we restrict the analysis to the subsample of losers 
and compare males with females (as in the right-hand panel of Figure 3). Therefore, 
in all estimates, the coefficient of the variable Correct shows the effect of an 
additional correct answer for males who lose the competition.  
Results show that choices under risk negatively correlate with the performance 
in the Coin Task only for males losing the tournament, even in a multivariate 
framework controlling for the degree of confidence and ability. 79  The effects of 
performance for males winning the tournament (Correct (Male) Winner) and for 
females losing (Correct Female (Loser)) are reported at the bottom of the Table. 
They are never statistically significant and they are significantly different from the 
effect that emerges for males losing (the interaction terms between Correct and 
Winner in the subsample of males and between Correct and Female in the subsample 
of losers are always significant at the 5% level except in column 3 where p-
value=0.105). This confirms that the positive relationship between risk aversion and 
performance in the Coin Task is not purely endogenous because it does not hold in 
general but we observe it only for males losing the tournament. 
 
[Table 6 Here] 
 
Further suggestive evidence that the relationship highlighted above may be genuine 
can be derived from the data of the second chapter which point to a not significant 




                                                          
79 Results in columns (1) and (2) are robust when we restrict the observations to the performance range 
where we observe both males winning and males losing the competition. 
127 
  
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Competition is important in a wide range of economic decisions, and this paper 
contributes to the literature by analysing the consequences of being exposed to 
competitive environments on subsequent individual risk-taking behaviour. The 
economics literature typically evaluates relative performance pay schemes only 
through their direct impact on productivity. However, competition is seldom a one-
shot phenomenon, as individuals face many situations involving competitive pressure 
and make relevant decisions even after competition is over. Therefore, besides short-
run effects on performance, competitive pressure may induce other effects that can 
affect subsequent decisions adding to its long-run impact. From this point of view 
risk attitudes are a natural candidate as a transmission mechanism. 
We investigate the causal effect of competition on subsequent risk-taking 
behaviour by running a lab experiment eliciting the risk attitudes of a sample of 
subjects that have performed a real effort task exogenously manipulated in terms of 
the degree of competitiveness. We do not find evidence of a statistically significant 
relationship between competition and risk aversion. We devote particular attention to 
the analysis of the effects across gender because several studies find that women 
differ from men in terms of both risk aversion and fondness for competition. Indeed, 
we find a novel and counterintuitive result: while females’ behaviour is stable across 
treatments and outcomes, males become more risk averse after losing in the 
competitive environment. Instead, there is no evidence of a symmetric more risk-
seeking behaviour after they win the tournament. 
The design of the experiment carefully controls for wealth effects and any other 
payoff-related determinant, thereby isolating the pure effect of competition at the 
individual level and excluding social comparison considerations. However, due to 
differences between treatment and control groups in how outcomes are determined, 
the evidence on outcome-dependent effects of competition on subsequent risk-taking 
behaviour is only suggestive. 
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We interpret our findings in terms of males' reaction to negative outcomes 
driven by intrinsic motives. One possible explanation is that the negative outcome 
may arouse emotions, which in turn affect the subsequent decision under risk. 
Alternatively, the negative outcome may induce a shift in the locus of control. Losing 
may reduce the extent to which one believes that he can predict or influence future 
events and this may, in turn, increase risk aversion.  
When losing in a competitive task, males might have an inclination to project 
their inability to control events even on subsequent decisions involving merely 
random outcomes. Our explanation is consistent with previous findings in the 
literature, e.g. that a shift in the locus of control causes an increase of risk aversion 
(Beisswingert et al., 2016).  
We believe that testing in a controlled manner our evidence on outcome and 
gender-dependent effects of competition on risk behaviour and identifying the 
ultimate cause why losing a competitive endeavour increases male’s risk aversion 
























Part of the literature on the gender gap in performance ascribes differences in 
competitive endeavours to overconfidence for males and underconfidence for females 
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). In order to check whether confidence has 
explanatory power in our setting, before performing the effort task, we elicit subjects’ 
expectations on their performance. We then use the difference between expected and 
realized score to measure their confidence, as commonly done in the literature on 
overconfidence (De Paola et al., 2014; Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2014). A negative 
number means that subjects are underconfident, as they identify more coins than what 
they expected. Vice versa, positive values indicate overconfidence.  
Subjects in our sample are underconfident on average, as the mean of the 
Confidence variable is equal to −9.15. Table 1 shows that the expected performance is 
lower than the actual one both in the baseline (12.9 − 21.6 = −8.7) and in the 
competition treatment (14.7 − 24.3 = −9.6). Confidence does not significantly differ 
either by treatment or by gender (Table 1A).  
As far as risk behaviour is concerned, a positive correlation emerges between 
confidence and the choice in the BRET (corr=0.152, p=0.085): forecasts improve 
with risk-seeking. This result is driven by the competition treatment (corr=0.238, 
p=0.051) while no correlation emerges for the baseline.    
 
[Table A1 Here] 
 
Although far from the observed performance on average, subjects’ expectations in the 
effort task turn out to be quite reliable, as they significantly correlate with the actual 
performance. Rather surprisingly, the correlation is stronger in the baseline 
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(correlation coefficient 0.54, significant at the 1% level) than in the competition 


















































































Table 1. Summary statistics by treatment 
 
 
 Baseline Competition Mann-
Whitney 
 Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev p-value 
Female 0.419 0.497 0.529 0.503 0.2113 
Age 21.177 2.440 21.294 3.686 0.8558 
Average Grade 25.419 4.091 25.985 2.668 0.5923 
Coin Task      
Total Coins 23.645 5.204 26.868 6.601 0.0048 
Correct 21.597 4.792 24.309 6.611 0.0035 
Wrong 2.048 3.07 2.559 3.312 0.0960 
Risk 
Behaviour 
     
Choice BRET  43.452 19.018 39.471 14.878 0.3588 
Expectations      
Expected 
Guessed Coins 
12.935 6.563 14.706 7.704 0.2332 




Table 2. Performance in the Coin Task by Treatment and Gender 
 
 
 All Baseline Competition Difference Mann-
Whitney 
Males 24.12 22.53 25.91 1.59 p=0.008 
Females 21.81 20.31 22.89 1.5 p=0.041 
Difference 2.31 2.22 3.02   
Mann-
Whitney  










Table 3. Risk Behaviour by Treatment and Gender 
 
 
 Males Females Difference Mann-Whitney 
Baseline 46.61 39.08 7.53 p=0.136 
Obs. 36 26   
Competition 39.25 39.67 -0.42 p=0.668 
Obs. 32 36   
Difference 7.36 -0.59   




Table 4. Risk Behaviour by Treatment and Outcome 
 
 
 Bad Outcome Good Outcome Difference Mann-Whitney 
Baseline 42.23 44.68 -2.45 p=0.587 
Competition 38.21 40.74 -2.53 p=0.547 
Difference 4.02 3.94   




Table 5. Risk Behaviour by Treatment, Gender and Outcome 
 
 
 Males Females 












Baseline 44.35 48.63 p=0.407 39.64 38.42 p=0.980 
Obs. 17 19  14 12  
Competition 35.14 42.44 p=0.177 40.35 38.81 p=0.620 
Obs. 14 18  20 16  
Mann-
Whitney  




Table 6. Risk behaviour and performance in competition 
 
 
 Choice BRET 
 Males Losers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Correct -1.4602*** -1.7035*** -1.4602*** -1.6214*** 
 (0.3795) (0.5124) (0.3779) (0.4522) 
Correct*Winner 1.4279** 1.4989**   
 (0.6521) (0.6310)   
Correct*Female   1.4739 1.8188** 
   (0.8820) (0.8072) 
Winner -22.7209 -25.9121   
 (19.7591) (18.7123)   
Female   -26.0464 -31.9327* 
   (19.0715) (17.9474) 
Confidence  -0.1983  -0.0884 
  (0.3014)  (0.2696) 
Average Grade  1.5852  2.9573*** 
  (1.1964)  (0.8325) 
Constant 66.1194*** 71.0617*** 66.1194*** 68.2202*** 
 (8.7244) (10.3456) (8.6880) (8.9368) 
Correct (Male) Winner -0.0323 -0.2047   
 (0.5304) (0.6595)   
Correct Female (Loser)   0.0137 0.1973 
   (0.7969) (0.6751) 
Observations 32 32 34 34 
Adj. R-squared 0.208 0.219 0.157 0.301 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate 
that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.  
 
 
Table A1. Confidence by Treatment and by Gender 
 
 
 Confidence  Confidence 
Baseline -8.66 Males -9.79 
Competition -9.60 Females -8.45 
Difference 0.94  -1.34 
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